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I N the complexity of today's business and tax jungle, a corporate
/president who does not obtain tax advice before an acquisition,
or merger or substantial dollar transaction ought to be fired."'
Texas taxes continue to impact heavily many business planning deci-
sions, as the state and taxpayers adapt and react to the other's planning.
The 1995 Legislature again amended sales, franchise and property tax
provisions, but the changes were far less dramatic than the franchise tax
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University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
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1. Brunley-Donaldson Co. v. Comm'r, 443 F.2d 501, 510 (9th Cir. 1971) (Trask, J.,
dissenting) (a little extra incentive for reading tax articles).
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changes adopted during the 1991 session. In some respects, the legisla-
ture's ability to tinker with specific provisions (and even to provide some
new exemptions2) rather than press for wholesale overhaul of the tax sys-
tem was based on the fact that the budget did not demand significantly
higher revenue than the current tax structure could produce, coupled
with the fact that no one has yet been able to design a practical, politically
viable way to replace all (or at least a substantial portion) of the property
taxes.
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
During the Survey period the United States Supreme Court issued a
sales tax decision that may prove to have far-reaching effects. In
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.3 the Court held that
the imposition of Oklahoma sales tax on the full value of bus tickets sold
for interstate travel did not violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. 4 Jefferson Lines, a common carrier, collected
Oklahoma sales tax on bus tickets for travel that originated and termi-
nated in Oklahoma, but the carrier did not collect Oklahoma sales tax on
bus tickets for interstate travel that originated in Oklahoma but ended
outside of Oklahoma. 5 The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower
courts, held that imposing Oklahoma sales tax on the full price of a bus
ticket for travel from Oklahoma to another state is consistent with the
Commerce Clause.6
In reaching its conclusion, the Court determined that the Oklahoma
sales tax met the four prong Complete Auto7 test: the tax must be applied
2. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (cleanroom exemption from sales tax).
3. 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995).
4. Id at 1346.
5. Oklahoma imposes sales tax on certain services, including transportation for hire.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1354(1)(C) (Supp. 1988).
6. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1335-36, 1346. Jefferson Lines filed for bankruptcy
and the Oklahoma Tax Commission filed proof of claims for uncollected sales tax on tick-
ets sold for interstate travel. The bankruptcy court disallowed the claims, holding that
allowing a sales tax on tickets sold for interstate travel would violate the Commerce Clause
by imposing an "undue burden on interstate commerce" and creating the "potential for
multiple taxation." Id at 1335. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court decision.
Id. The court of appeals also affirmed the bankruptcy court decision and held that the tax
was unconstitutional because it was not fairly apportioned. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15
F.3d 90 (8th Cir. 1994). The Oklahoma Tax Commission argued that application of the
sales tax on the ticket's full value was justified because the sale of a bus ticket is a wholly
local transaction. The Eighth Circuit rejected the Commission's argument and reasoned
that there was no distinction between the sales tax at issue and an unapportioned New
York state tax on an interstate busline's gross receipts that the Supreme Court had re-
viewed in an earlier decision. 15 F.3d at 92-93. The Supreme Court had previously held
such a tax to be unconstitutional in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653,
663 (1948) (holding that New York's taxation of an interstate busline's gross receipts was
constitutionally limited to that portion reflecting miles traveled within the taxing
jurisdiction).
7. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (establishing the
test for determining the constitutionality of a state tax on interstate commerce).
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to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, it must be
fairly apportioned, it may not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and it must be fairly related to the services provided by the taxing state.8
The nexus prong of the test was met in that the bus ticket was purchased
and the service originated in Oklahoma. The crux of the Court's decision
lies in its analysis of the apportionment challenge, the second prong of
the Complete Auto test.9
The Court found that the Oklahoma tax was internally consistent be-
cause the transaction would not be subject to multiple taxation if every
state imposed a similar tax on ticket sales within the taxing state for travel
originating within that state.10 The Court noted that an internally consis-
tent tax has long been held to be externally consistent as well and that
Jefferson Lines offered no reason to reconsider such premise.' There-
fore, the Court found that the tax was externally consistent and reached
only the activity taking place within the taxing state, which activity is the
sale of the service.' 2 The Court declined to distinguish a sales tax on the
sale of tangible personal property from the sale of a service. In the opin-
ion of the Court, a sale of a service can ordinarily by treated as a local
state event "just as readily as a sale of tangible personal property can be
located solely within the [s]tate of delivery.' 3
The Court found the tax met the third prong of the Complete Auto test,
that the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce, since no
argument was presented that Oklahoma discriminates against out-of-state
8. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1331, 1338.
9. The focus of the second prong is whether a tax is fairly apportioned, which re-
quires that an apportioned tax be both internally and externally consistent. Internal con-
sistency requires examining whether the identical application of a tax by every state would
place interstate commerce at a disadvantage to intrastate commerce. External consistency
examines the economic justification of the taxing state's claim on the value taxed to deter-
mine whether the tax extends "beyond the portion that is fairly attributable to the eco-
nomic activity within the taxing [s]tate." Id. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 465 U.S. 169 (1983).
10. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1338. The Court illustrates its reasoning with an ex-
ample in a footnote: Texas could not tax the full value of bus service for a trip from
Oklahoma City to Dallas when the ticket is sold in Oklahoma because such a tax would be
internally inconsistent. Id. at 1342 n.6.
11. Id. at 1340-42. The Court disregarded Jefferson Lines' argument that apportion-
ment on the basis of miles was the only way to ensure no threat of double taxation. Id. at
1343. In fact, the Court found that Jefferson Lines' reliance on Central Greyhound was
misplaced and not controlling because the tax at issue in that case posed a threat of double
taxation, unlike the tax at issue here. Id. at 1341.
12. Id. at 1344. The Court reasoned that the taxable event was the agreement, pay-
ment and delivery of some of the services in the taxing state. No other state could claim to
have all three events also occur within their state and so the taxable event, a sale with
partial delivery, could not also occur in another state. Thus multiple taxation would be
precluded. Id. at 1341.
13. Id. at 1340. The Court notes that taxable sales are consistently upheld without any
apportionment among states, regardless of any activity outside the taxing jurisdiction that
may have preceded the sale or may occur in the future. Id. at 1339; see, e.g., McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 58 (1940) (finding that a necessary condition
for imposing tax was "a local activity, delivery of goods within the [s]tate upon their
purchase for consumption").
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enterprises. 14 The Court also found no merit in the argument that the tax
discriminates against interstate activity. 15 In the Court's opinion, the tax
met the last prong, that the tax must be fairly related to the taxpayer's
presence or activities in the state, because the tax was on a sale that took
place wholly in the state of Oklahoma and was "measured by the value of
the service purchased."' 6 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, dis-
sented from the decision.' 7
The Austin Court of Appeals issued an important decision during the
Survey period that clearly shows the application of the "essence of the
transaction" doctrine to the sale of services.18 In Direct Resources, the
court addressed the issue of whether the portion of a direct mail business
which involved the application of mailing addresses on envelopes by
means of an ink-jet machine was a taxable service pursuant to section
151.005(4) of the Tax Code, pertaining to printing or imprinting of tangi-
ble personal property, or if it falls under section 151.0101(a)(12), pertain-
ing to data processing services.' 9 Direct Resources asserted that the
addressing of envelopes was not a taxable activity and that the "essence
of the transaction" was providing a non-taxable direct-mail service. 20 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Direct Resources on
the taxability issue (but not on attorney fees), and the court of appeals
affirmed.21 In explicitly basing its decision on the essence of the transac-
tion doctrine, the court confirmed that "[tihe established test for deter-
mining whether a transaction is subject to sales tax involves the
14. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1344.
15. Id. at 1345.
16. Id. at 1346.
17. The dissenters found that the tax at issue in Jefferson Lines and the tax at issue in
Central Greyhound were identical for all relevant purposes and since the gross receipts tax
in Central Greyhound was held unconstitutional, the Oklahoma sales tax should also be
unconstitutional. Id. at 1346. The dissenters found multiple similarities in the two cases:
both involved taxes imposed on interstate bus transportation, the respective states did not
apportion their taxes to apply to the cost or value of the in-state portion only, there was
similar statutory language for both taxes, and both taxes were imposed on gross receipts
measured by sales. Id. at 1347. The dissenters conducted a careful analysis of the facts that
the majority relied upon to distinguish the tax in Central Greyhound from that in Jefferson
Lines. They also addressed the majority's reliance on Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252
(1989) (upholding an Illinois tax on interstate telephone calls that originated or terminated
in Illinois). The dissenters concluded by quoting the court of appeals, "that this 'is a classic
instance of an unapportioned tax' upon interstate commerce." Id. at 1349 (quoting In re
Jefferson Lines, 15 F.3d 90, 93).
18. Sharp v. Direct Resources for Print, Inc., 910 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex. App.-Austin
1995, writ requested). See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Annual Survey of Texas Law: Taxa-
tion, 48 SMU L. REv. 1579, 1583 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Tax Survey] for a discussion of
the district court's disposition of this case.
19. Direct Resources, 910 S.W.2d at 538-40. The comptroller argued that the portion
of the business which used the ink-jet machine was a taxable printing or imprinting service,
and that such activity was a taxable data processing service since the ink-jet machine used
computer components for the machine to read addresses off magnetic tape and apply ad-
dresses to envelopes.
20. See Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1977); see
also 1995 Tax Survey, supra note 18, at 1583 (discussion of essence of the transaction
doctrine).
21. Direct Resources, No. 93-00796 (353d Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., July 11, 1994).
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determination of the ultimate object or essence of the transaction. '22
The court therefore held that, in Direct Resources' case,
[p]erformance of the addressing component by an ink-jet machine
does not transform the essence of the transaction into printing for
consideration. The customer's desired finished product is not ad-
dressed envelopes but the receipt of advertising materials by ad-
dressees. We conclude that printing for consideration as
contemplated by section 151.005(4) of the Tax Code does not apply
to a printing component of a transaction, the essence of which is a
mailing service. 23
Numerous cases continue to challenge the comptroller's interpretation
of the manufacturing exemption. Determining what constitutes property
"used" in manufacturing has been the focus of several recent court cases
and administrative hearings. For example, in reviewing an appeal of an
administrative decision, taxpayers won a significant victory in district
court regarding the "one-step removed" exclusion to the manufacturing
exemption.24 In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Sharp,25 the taxpayer re-
quested a refund of sales tax paid on machinery and equipment used to
make sand molds that the taxpayer used in manufacturing cast-iron pipe
fittings. At the administrative level, the judge had denied the refund and
held that the mold-making equipment and machinery was one-step re-
moved from the manufacturing process and thus was taxable. 26 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of Tyler Pipe.27
Taxpayers marked another victory at the district court level concerning
the interpretation of an additional exclusion to the manufacturing exemp-
22. Direct Resources, 910 S.W.2d at 538. See also Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating
Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1977); Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Multiple Listing
Serv., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Williams &
Lee Scouting Serv., Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ
ref'd).
23. Direct Resources, 910 S.W.2d at 540-41.
24. The comptroller has refused to allow a manufacturing exemption for equipment
used in a process one-step removed from the actual manufacturing process on the basis
that only equipment directly used in manufacturing will satisfy the statutory exemption.
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a)(2) (Vernon 1992).
25. No. 9307993 (126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 14,1994), appeal docketed,
No. 3-95-00212-CV (Tex. App.-Austin 1995).
26. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 27,971 (Mar. 8, 1993),1993 Tex. Tax LEXIS
83, at *17.
27. Tyler Pipe Indus., No. 9307993 (126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 14,1994).
Similarly, the same district court had previously reviewed the one-step removed theory in
Gulf Marine Fabricators, Inc. v. Sharp, No. 9308377 (126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.,
July 19, 1994). Gulf Marine was an appeal from Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
28,900 (July 21, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXis 212. At the administrative level, the judge had
denied a manufacturer's request for partial refund of taxes paid on cranes, winches and
accessories under the phase-in manufacturing exemption. The standard employed by the
administrative law judge was whether the machinery or equipment fabricated products.
The administrative law judge held that the machinery or equipment was one-step removed
from the actual manufacturing process and thus taxable. Id. at *8-9. On appeal, the comp-
troller entered into an Agreed Judgment with taxpayer to refund the tax. Gulf Marine
(126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., July 19, 1994).
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tion, the intraplant transportation exclusion.2 8 In Chevron Chemical Co.
v. Sharp,29 the court found that pipe used in the manufacture of polyeth-
ylene pellets is exempt manufacturing equipment and is not excluded as
intraplant transportation.30
In ADP Corp. v. Sharp,31 the district court examined the meaning of
the statutory term "separately identified" as used in Tax Code Section
151.007(c)(4) which provides that, with respect to conditional or deferred
payment sales, if finance charges are separately identified to a customer,
then such charges are not included in the sales price and thus tax is not
due on such receipts. The comptroller argued that in order to be "sepa-
rately identified" as prescribed by the statute, the finance charge must be
written plainly in the document signed by the customer. Furthermore,
the fact that the finance charge can be calculated using various numbers
in the document is not sufficient to meet the exemption. The court
agreed with the comptroller and held for the state.32
During the Survey period, the comptroller faced several Commerce
Clause challenges to the standards for what activities give rise to nexus
for sales tax purposes. In Decision 32,349 the taxpayer, a retailer of com-
puter products, contended it did not have sufficient nexus to require col-
lection of use tax on items sold to Texas customers.33 The administrative
law judge found that the taxpayer was doing business in Texas because
the company derived rentals from the lease of its software used in Texas
and because the taxpayer's employees were sent to Texas to train custom-
ers in the use of the hardware and software.34 The licensing of software
and personnel training constituted a sufficient physical presence to meet
the substantial nexus requirement of both the Commerce Clause 35 of the
28. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Sharp, No. 9306300 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.,
June 29, 1995), appeal docketed, No. 03-95-00628-CV (Tex. App.-Austin 1995). See TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(c)(2) (Vernon 1992).
29. No. 9306300 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., June 29, 1995), appeal docketed,
No. 03-95-00628-CV (Tex. App.-Austin 1995).
30. The statutory exemption for property used in manufacturing specifically excludes
from exemption intraplant transportation equipment. TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.318(c)(2). Numerous comptroller decisions have addressed what type of equipment
qualifies as intraplant transportation. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,287
(Dec. 7, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS 403 (in-line conveyors); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 28,723 (Aug. 31, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS 204 (conveyors in assembly
line); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,900 (July 21, 1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS
212 (cranes, man-lifts and winches); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,700 (July 15,
1992), 1992 Tex. Tax LEXIS 204 (towveyor and conveyor equipment); Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 19,986 (Jan. 28, 1987), 2 [TEX.] ST. TAX. REP. (CCH) 1 401-387
(cranes); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 18,662 (Mar. 12, 1986), 1986 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 575 (loaders).
31. No. 9204853 (167th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., July 5, 1995), appeal docketed,
No. 03-95-00508-CV (Tex. App.-Austin 1995) (examining TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.007(c)(4) (Vernon 1992)).
32. Id.
33. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,349 (Jan. 30, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
38.
34. Id. at *7-8.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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United States Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, 36 according to
the administration law judge. 37 Therefore, the taxpayer was required to
collect use tax on its sales and rentals of hardware and sales and licenses
of software.
The comptroller increasingly faces challenges to the taxable services
provisions as the comptroller and taxpayers alike struggle to interpret
and define those services subject to tax and those that qualify for applica-
ble exemption. Data processing is one of the taxable services that is fre-
quently the subject of controversy and adversarial proceedings. This is
because the comptroller adheres to a very broad definition of data
processing and taxpayers challenge such liberal interpretation of the stat-
ute. The issue of whether electronic calculators used in inventory services
constitute data processing has been the subject of recent comptroller
decisions.
In Decision 29,740 the comptroller held that a taxpayer's business of
taking physical inventory for convenience stores by using a hand-held cal-
culator designed for such purpose was not a taxable data processing ser-
vice.38 The tax division argued that the calculators were computers and
that the taxpayer's service was taxable data processing under Rule
3.330.39 The administrative law judge found that the taxpayer could not
program the calculators, consequently, the calculators did not meet the
dictionary definition of "computer" and the service was not data process-
ing but rather it was non-taxable auditing services.40
Decisions 30,695 and 32,269 reached the same conclusion, but on differ-
ent grounds. 41 In these cases, the taxpayer provided an inventory count-
ing service which used small electronic calculators. The taxpayer had
provided this service in the past without using the hand-held computer
and continued to do so with some clients. The administrative law judge
noted that the service involved more than just entry, retrieval, storage
and manipulation of data into and from a computer. The judge held that
the use of a hand-held computer did not make the taxpayer's inventory
service a taxable data processing service because the computer simply fa-
cilitated the taxpayer's service and therefore was excluded from Rule
3.330.42
Decisions 30,794 and 31,025 held that a taxpayer's lease of a paved lot
was not transformed into a taxable motor vehicle parking service, be-
36. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912-13 (1992) (holding a North
Dakota use tax requiring certain out-of-state vendors to collect the state's use tax violated
the Commerce Clause); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967).
37. 1995 Tex. Tax LEXis 38 at *7-8.
38. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,740 (Feb. 22, 1995), 2 [TEX.] ST. TAX REP.
(CCH) 1 401-854.
39. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (West 1995).
40. 2 [TEx.] ST. TAX REP. at 26,465.
41. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 30,695 & 32,269 (Feb. 21, 1995), 2 [TEX.] ST.
TAX REP. (CCH) 401-859.
42. Id. at 26,485. See also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (West 1995).
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cause even though taxpayer added a security fence and gate, painted
stripes on the lot and used the lot for parking, the taxpayer did not pro-
vide a service.43 The tax division attempted to tax the lease agreement as
a taxable service but the administrative law judge determined that in or-
der for the agreement to be taxable as motor vehicle parking it must in-
clude some element of a parking-related service." The agreement at
issue was the transfer of a real property interest which provided for no
services.
In Decision 30,261 the comptroller found that services performed for
an insurance company by a nationwide consulting firm were subject to
sales tax as insurance services. 45 The taxpayer provided a variety of actu-
arial and management consulting services to insurance company clients,
including analyzing assets for a potential purchase of an insurance com-
pany, historical analysis, profitability projections and financial repayment
analysis. The administrative law judge held that under Rule 3.355 the
taxpayer's activities came within the definition of insurance services and
therefore were taxable.46
The phase-in of the manufacturing exemption has been the subject of
many planning and purchasing decisions. 47 Recently, the comptroller
held that the purchase of packaging materials used to assemble non-man-
ufactured items is not exempt. In Decision 33,524, the comptroller as-
sessed a tax on wrapping and packaging materials used in preparing non-
sterile medical kits for hospital customers.48 The administrative law
judge determined that the taxpayer, who purchased finished goods from
vendors, and then combined, repackaged and shrink-wrapped the goods
into kits, was not engaged in processing or fabricating under the defini-
tions of Rule 3.300; therefore, the taxpayer was not entitled to
exemption. 49
Decision 30,880 addressed what type of documentation is sufficient to
prove the existence of an "agreement" which transfers ownership of tan-
gible personal property in the absence of a comprehensive document or
agreement concerning the sale of the property.50 The taxpayer was in the
43. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 30,794 & 31,025 (June 29, 1994), 2 [TEx.] ST.
TAX REP. (CCH) 1 401-836.
44. Id. at 26,384-386.
45. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,261 (Feb. 13, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
73.
46. Id. at *15 (citing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.355 (West 1995)).
47. Prior to 1995, the amount of the refund or the reduced amount of tax due under
the manufacturing exemption of section 151.318 of the Texas Tax Code was calculated on a
graduated scale, ranging from 25% of the tax paid to the state for property purchased
during 1990, to a 75% reduction for property purchased during 1994. The phase-in is now
complete and property purchased on or after January 1, 1995 that qualifies for the manu-
facturing exemption is fully exempt. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(h)(6) (Vernon 1992).
48. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,524 (Mar. 14,1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
149.
49. Id. at *9; see also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300 (West 1995).
50. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,880 (June 30, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
311; see 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(b)(3) (West 1995). Rule 3.300(b)(3) provides that a
separate charge for a manufacturing aid will be a sale to the customer "only if there is a
1338 [Vol. 49
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business of making molded components, custom packing parts and pack-
aging materials for use in shipping electronic and other equipment. As
evidence that a written agreement existed, the taxpayer produced an affi-
davit of the company's president, as well as several transactional docu-
ments, such as bids, purchase orders and purchase and sale invoices. The
court found that the evidence was sufficient to show the existence of a
written agreement concerning the customer's ownership of the molds.
Therefore, the taxpayer proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
molds were purchased for resale and no tax was due on taxpayer's
purchase of the molds. 51
Decision 28,916 involved a taxpayer who was in the business of selling
and leasing computer equipment, including the sale of equipment leases it
entered into initially with third parties.52 The administrative law judge
held, based on Rule 3.294 and comptroller policy, that the simultaneous
assignment of leased property and the right to receive future payments
under the lease constitute sales of tangible personal property.53 The tax
division also argued that amounts for transaction fees and commissions
under remarketing agreements represented compensation for services as
part of the lease assignments and should be included as part of the sales
price. The administrative law judge found that such amounts were
"memo entries" representing amounts contingent on future events and
thus were not part of the sales price.54
In Decision 32,516 the administrative law judge faced the issue of when
an agency relationship is established with a tax-exempt entity.55 The tax-
payer entered into contracts with tax-exempt entities to provide architec-
tural services. The contracts provided that one original set of design and
construction documents would be provided as part of the taxpayer's basic
services and that the client would purchase, at its own expense, all addi-
tional sets of documents. On the basis of the contract language, the ad-
ministrative law judge found that the purchase of additional sets of
documents by the taxpayer was a purchase as agent for the tax-exempt
entities and thus not subject to sales tax.56
There continues to be uncertainty concerning the availability of an ex-
emption to a buyer who buys less than all the assets of a business or buys
written agreement between [the] parties clearly making the customer the owner .. " and
that the customer will owe the tax unless the aid qualifies for the manufacturing exemption
or is purchased for resale.
51. 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS 311 at *10-11. The administrative law judge, however, added
that the audit should be revised to include sales tax on the sale of the property by the
taxpayer, unless the taxpayer could show that its sale was exempt. Id. at *13.
52. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,916 (Mar. 13, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
95.
53. Id. at *13 (citing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294 (West 1995)). The administrative
law judge noted that the lease assignments could be tax-free sales for resale if valid resale
certificates were obtained. Id. at *15.
54. Id. at *22.
55. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,516 (Feb. 23, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
130.
56. Id. at *10.
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a segment of a business. The comptroller has recently recognized a de
minimis exception to the occasional sale exemption. In Decision 32,398
the taxpayer acquired all of the assets of a business, which consisted of
approximately 25,000 separate assets.57 Sixteen of the assets were ex-
cluded from the transfer (generally, chairs, desks, credenzas). The ad-
ministrative law judge held that the assets that were not transferred were
so insignificant in number and value that the transaction still qualified as
the acquisition of the entire operating assets of the seller, and thus was
exempt as an occasional sale.5 8 The decision states (in a footnote) that, in
determining whether assets that are not transferred are de minimis, con-
sideration must be given to both the value and quantity of such assets.59
The Comptroller advanced similar arguments in an attempt to deny the
occasional sales exemption to foreclosing entities in Decisions 31,839,
31,709, 31,711.60 The tax division argued in these hearings that the trans-
fer of assets from a subsidiary (Sub 1) to the parent and then to another
subsidiary (Sub 2) would not qualify as an occasional sale. The tax divi-
sion acknowledged the transfer from Sub 1 to the parent may qualify as
the transfer of the entire operating assets of an identifiable segment. Ac-
cording to the tax division, however, the assets then cease to be assets of
an identifiable segment of parent, and the transfer from parent to Sub 2
would not qualify as an occasional sale under section 151.304(b)(2). 61
The taxpayers argued that the transaction qualified as an occasional sale
under section 151.304(b)(3) as the transfer of all or substantially all the
property used by a person in the course of an activity, if the real or ulti-
mate ownership of the property remains substantially similar. The tax
division argued that the transfer from the parent to Sub 2 would not qual-
ify because the parent would not have used the assets in the course of an
activity. The administrative law judge held that the taxpayer failed to
carry its burden of proof and therefore did not specifically rule on the tax
division's assertions. 62
Decision 32,305 addressed the issue of when tax applies to progress
billings.63 The taxpayer billed customers for refurbished industrial com-
pressors by progress billing, but did not bill its customers for sales and use
tax until the final billing, which occurred on the first of either the passing
of title or possession. The tax division argued that the taxpayer was re-
quired to collect sales tax with each billing. The administrative law judge
disagreed with the tax division and held that sales tax was due on the
57. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,398 (Dec. 6, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS
589.
58. Id. at *9.
59. Id. at * 9-10 n.3.
60. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 31,839, 31,709, 31,711 (May 9, 1995), 1995
Tex. Tax LEXIS 249.
61. Id.; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon 1992).
62. 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS 249 at *21.
63. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,305 (Feb. 13, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
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total sales price at the earlier of transfer of title or possession.64
Decision 33,136 illustrates the increasing importance of careful tax
planning and precise documentation. 65 In this hearing the taxpayer en-
tered into contracts with two companies for the purchase of services. The
contracts included the language "[c]ontractor shall assume full responsi-
bility for and shall pay all taxes and licenses required in connection with
the work."'66 The taxpayer contended that amounts with respect to these
contracts were incorrectly assessed because the vendors assumed respon-
sibility for the taxes under the tax-included contracts. The administrative
law judge held that the generalized language contained in the contracts
was too ambiguous to show that taxes were included in the contract.67
With respect to one of the companies, however, the contract explicitly
incorporated the taxpayer's purchase order and a notation on the
purchase order clearly indicated "taxes included." The administrative
law judge held that, since the vendor held a sales tax permit, the notation
on the purchase order, together with the general contract language, was
sufficient to show sales taxes were included in the selling price.68
The comptroller's strict scrutiny of resale and exemption certificates
exemplifies the need for taxpayers to ensure they adhere strictly to the
resale and exemption certificate procedural provisions. In Decision
32,297 the administrative law judge held that a lump sum subcontractor
did not accept an exemption certificate in good faith because the subcon-
tractor did not verify with the comptroller's office that the entity execut-
ing the certificate was a tax-exempt organization. 69 The subcontractor
relied upon representations of the prime contractor and receipt of a prop-
erly completed exemption certificate. According to this decision, how-
ever, Rule 3.291 requires contractors to request additional evidence of
the exempt status of the organization if the validity of the exemption is
not clear.70
Decision 32,834 illustrates the importance of careful and correct pay-
ment of taxes.71 The decision involved a contractor who performed im-
provements to residential realty under lump-sum contracts. The
64. Id. at *5. In explaining his decision, the administrative law judge noted that in a
letter written after the audit period but directly on point, the Comptroller's Tax Adminis-
trative Division had confirmed that this is the correct standard. Id.
65. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,136 (June 13, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
327.
66. Id. at *2.
67. Id. at *7.
68. Id. at *8-9.
69. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,297 (Mar. 23, 1995), 2 [TEX.] ST. TAX
REP. (CCH) 1 401-852.
70. Id. at 26,445; see 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291 (West 1995); see also Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,768 (Jan. 24, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 49 (holding that
resale certificates which did not contain descriptions of the taxable items generally sold by
the purchasers were not accepted by the seller in good faith and the sales were thus
taxable).




contractor did not pay tax on the materials used in the lump-sum con-
tracts. The contractor, however, incorrectly added tax directly to the
lump-sum billings of some of its customers. Technically, the state re-
ceived most of the money due on the transactions at issue, but the tax was
received from the wrong party (the buyers). The contractor sought to
offset its tax deficiency from failure to pay tax on the materials with the
erroneously submitted tax. The administrative law judge denied the off-
set, in part because the taxes were improperly collected from the buyers
and those buyers could make refund claims that the contractor would be
obligated to honor.72
B. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The Regular Session of the Seventy-Fourth Legislature produced nu-
merous amendments, additions, and revisions to the Texas Tax Code.
Many of the tax revisions were intended as "cleanup" provisions to clarify
existing law but the legislature made many substantive changes to the Tax
Code as well.
As with past sessions, the legislature made numerous amendments to
the taxable services provisions in a continuing effort to refine the proper
application of sales tax to various services. 73 The legislature made several
revisions to the definitions of certain taxable services in an effort to ex-
pand the definition of a particular taxable service or specifically exclude
certain services from the taxable definition.
An amendment to the definition of "debt collection service" in section
151.0036 expanded the statutory definition to include a service performed
for which a fee is collected under Article 902274 and to provide that the
person collecting the check shall add the amount of tax to the fee and
collect the fee from the drawer or endorser of the check. 75
The definition of "information service" in section 151.0038 changed to
exclude, and thus exempt from taxation, the furnishing of information to
a member of a homeowners association of a residential subdivision or
condominium development, if furnished by the association or on behalf
of the association.76
Section 151.0048 excludes from the definition of "real property ser-
vice" those services purchased by a contractor as part of the improvement
of real property with a new structure to be used as a residence or other
improvement immediately adjacent to the new structure and used in the
72. Id at *11. However, since, under the comptroller's interpretation, the state would
not pay refunds to the customers, the state could not be required to pay the refund amount
more than once, so the state would not be harmed. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hear-
ing No. 32,838 (July 20, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS 441 (denying similar offset).
73. See S.B. 640, 74th Leg., R.S., (1000), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 5009 (Vernon).
74. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9022 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (regarding a processing
fee by the holder of a dishonored check).
75. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0036(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
76. Id § 151.0038(a)(1)(B).
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residential occupancy of the structure. 77 The statute now includes a defi-
nition of "contractor" for purposes of this provision.78
The legislature also amended section 151.350 to clarify an exemption
for labor to "restore" certain property damaged in a disaster area, and to
define "restore" to include repair, restore or remodel to the extent the
service is a real property repair or remodeling service or a taxable ser-
vice.79 The session also expanded the exemption for lawn services to al-
low exemption for services provided by self-employed individuals or by
persons under 18 or over 65 if receipts from the services do not exceed
$5,000 in the most recent four quarters.80 The legislature added an ex-
emption for court reporting services relating to the preparation of a docu-
ment or other record in a civil or criminal suit and sold to and prepared
for a person involved in the suit.81
Several industry specific changes were made to the taxable service pro-
visions. The amendment to section 151.0047 excludes, and therefore ex-
empts from "real property repairs and remodeling," improvements to a
manufacturing or processing production unit in a petrochemical refinery
or chemical plant that provides increased capacity in the production
unit.82 Corresponding definitions for "increased capacity" and "produc-
tion unit" were added. 83 In addition, the legislature amended sections
151.3111 and 151.3161 to provide a specific exemption for certain services
and property used in commercial timber operations.8s
The legislature also clarified and added provisions regarding exemp-
tions for the sale of certain tangible personal property.85 The amended
exemption regarding newspapers and property used in newspaper publi-
cations deletes the provision that specified internal or external wrapping,
packing and packing supplies were not exempt.86 Section 151.313, which
allows exemption for certain health care supplies, now includes hospital
beds as medical equipment. 87
The exemption for certain agricultural products, has been expanded to
include certain pollution control equipment and to provide a definition of
"original producer. 88 The amended section 151.342, which exempts cer-
tain agribusiness items, now includes an exemption for poultry cages used
exclusively as containers in transporting poultry to processing. 89 The leg-
77. Id. § 151.0048(b)(c).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 151.350. Prior to amendment the exemption referred to labor to "repair"
certain property damaged in a disaster area. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.350 (Vernon
Supp. 1996).
80. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.347 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
81. Id. § 151.353 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
82. Id. § 151.0047(a)(3)(6).
83. Id. § 151.0047(b).
84. Id. §§ 151.3111(b)(5) and 151.3161 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
85. See S.B. 982, 74th Leg., R.S., (351), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2881 (Vernon).
86. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.319(e)(5) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996).
87. Id. § 151.313(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
88. Id. § 151.316(a)(8), (c)(2) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996).
89. Id. § 151.342(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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islature also revoked the sales tax exemption for food products, meals,
soft drinks, and candy sold to prison inmates.90 Under revised section
151.314, which exempts sales of certain food products by youth, the age of
the seller to which the exemption applies is now 19 years, rather than
18.91
The legislature clarified the exemption for gas and electricity except
when sold for commercial or residential use. "Residential use" is use by
the owner of the building. The amendment expanded the definition of
residential use to include such use by a tenant under a contract for an
express initial term of more than 29 consecutive days.92 In addition, the
definition of "commercial use" now specifically excludes (and thereby ex-
empts from sales tax) the off-wing processing, overhaul, or repair of a jet
turbine engine or its parts for a certificated or licensed carrier of persons
or property. 93
Prior to 1995, the amount of the refund or the reduced amount of tax
due regarding the manufacturing exemption of section 151.318 was deter-
mined on a graduated scale. 94 The phase-in is now complete and prop-
erty that qualifies for the manufacturing exemption that is purchased on
or after January 1, 1995, is exempted from the taxes imposed by Chapter
151. 95 The legislature made a significant amendment to the manufactur-
ing exemption to include qualifying equipment leased for more than a
year.96 The exemption for property used in manufacturing was also ex-
tended to semiconductor fabrication cleanrooms and equipment and pro-
vided a definition of those terms.97 In addition, the eligibility for
manufacturing exemption regarding certain aircraft repair expands to in-
clude supplies used in electrochemical plating or a similar process, such as
aluminum oxide, nitric acid, and sodium cyanide.98
The legislature made several transportation-related amendments to the
sales and use tax provisions. The definition of exempt aircraft has
changed to specify the conditions under which aircraft used for flight in-
struction are exempt.99 The amendment also clarifies that the exemption
90. Id. § 151.314(g). (Does this repeal mean that prisoners will allege cruel and unu-
sual punishment?).
91. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(e)(1) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996).
92. Id. § 151.317(c)(1)(B).
93. Id. § 151.317(c)(2)(A)(v).
94. Id. § 151.318(h) (Vernon 1992).
95. Id.; see supra note 47.
96. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(e) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The statute previously
provided that the exemption did not apply to any taxable item rented or leased to a person
engaged in manufacturing (except for certain video, broadcast, etc. under § 151.318(p)).
See id. (Vernon 1992).
97. Id. § 151.318(b)(2)(9) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The exemption is for all tangible per-
sonal property used in connection with the manufacturing, processing or fabrication in a
cleanroom environment of a semiconductor product, regardless of whether the property is
actually used in the cleanroom environment. The exemption does not include the building
or a permanent, nonremovable component of the building that houses the cleanroom envi-
ronment, but does include moveable cleanroom partitions and cleanroom lighting. Id.
98. Id. § 151.318(n).
99. Id. § 151.328(a)(2)(B).
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for repair, remodeling and maintenance services for certificated or li-
censed carriers is applicable to persons who provide flight instruction.
The expanded list of exempt items now includes supplies used or con-
sumed in the repair, remodeling or maintenance of aircraft, and exempts
tangible personal property necessary in normal aircraft operations, as
well as any property pumped, poured or otherwise placed in the air-
craft. 100 The legislature adopted an exemption for electricity, natural gas
and other fuel used predominately in repairing, maintaining, or restoring
railroad rolling stock. 1° 1 The legislature also amended the sales tax ex-
emption regarding stevedoring services to include materials and supplies
purchased for a ship or vessel operating exclusively in foreign or inter-
state coastal commerce, if the materials and supplies are loaded aboard
the ship or vessel and are not removed before departure.'0 2
The legislature amended section 151.154 regarding resale certificates to
clarify that the liability of a purchaser for use other than resale applies to
the divergent use of any taxable item (as opposed to the previous lan-
guage which specified only tangible personal property). 10 3 Liability is im-
posed with respect to the value of the tangible personal property or the
value of the taxable service. 1°4 The original purchase price is the measure
of tax for tangible personal property without a fair market rental value or
a taxable service with no fair market value; tax for divergent use may be
paid on the original purchase price without credit for taxes previously
paid.'0 5 Similar provisions regarding divergent use and the fair market
value of tangible personal property and taxable services were also added
to section 151.155 regarding exemption certificates.10 6
The legislature amended several sales tax provisions to specifically ad-
dress the application of the resale provisions to sales made in Mexico as
well as the exchange of confidential tax information between the two
countries. 10 7 The amendment to section 151.006 broadens the sale-for-
resale exemption to include the purchase of tangible personal property or
a taxable service in Texas for resale, lease or transfer to another in the
United Mexican States.'0 8 Correspondingly, section 151.152 now pro-
vides the resale certificate requirements for such sales.10 9 The amend-
ment allows resale certificates to be issued to persons reselling in Mexico
if the reseller provides a United Mexican States federal identification
number and any other comptroller required information, in addition to
100. Id. § 151.328(b),(d),(e).
101. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.331(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
102. Id. § 151.329(4) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996).
103. Id. § 151.154(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
104. Id. The value of a taxable service is the fair market value; the amount that a
purchaser would pay on the open market to obtain the service for their own use.
105. Id. § 151.154(b).
106. Id. § 151.155(b).
107. See S.B. 982, 74th Leg., R.S., (351), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2881 (Vernon).
108. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.006 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
109. Id. § 151.152(c). Prior to this amendment, the purchaser could obtain a refund
from the Texas retailer after securing acceptable documentation proving the items were
exported beyond the territorial limits of the United States.
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the current requirements for resale certificates. 110
The revised section 151.027, regarding confidentiality of tax informa-
tion, authorizes the comptroller to allow the examination of certain confi-
dential tax information by officials of the United Mexican States."'
Section 111.006, which pertains to the confidentiality of information such
as federal tax return information and information obtained during the
course of an examination by the comptroller, now provides an exception
to such confidentiality and allows examination by certain state, federal
and United Mexican States officials or representatives, provided that the
examination is authorized by the comptroller and a reciprocal agreement
exists with respect to similar information." 2
Several other amendments were made to various taxes including the
motor vehicle tax," 3 insurance taxes,114 severance taxes5" and mixed
beverage taxes. 16
C. REGULATORY UPDATE
Many administrative rules were amended during the Survey period,
most of which were in response to the legislative changes enacted during
the 1995 session. Some of the amendments remained in proposed form at
the end of the Survey period and the comptroller was still in the process
of drafting rules to implement the legislative changes.
During the Survey period the comptroller adopted an amendment to
Rule 3.319 to deny prior contract relief to two-party contracts." 7 This
amendment officially enacted a policy change instituted by the comptrol-
ler in 1992 that specified that only third-party contracts could qualify for
exemption as a prior contract." 8 The amendment excludes two-party
contracts if enabling legislation allows the exemption when the items are
used "for or in the performance of a contract."" 9 In addition, the
amendments delete the requirement that both parties sign the contract' 20
110. Id.
111. Id. § 151.027(c).
112. Id. § 111.006(d).
113. See S.B. 1445, 74th Leg., R.S., (1015), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 5077 (Vernon).
114. See S.B. 641, 74th Leg., R.S., (279), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2619 (Vernon).
115. See H.B. 398, 74th Leg., R.S., (895), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4415 (Vernon).
116. See S.B. 643, 74th Leg., R.S., (1001) 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws. 5030 (Vernon).
117. 20 Tex. Reg. 1009 (1995), adopted 20 Tex. Reg. 3839 (1995) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319).
118. Id.
119. Id. Interestingly the preamble to Rule 3.319 provides that the amendment is ap-
plied retroactively "to ensure continuity in the comptroller's application" of Calvert v.
British-American Oil Producing Co., 397 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1965). Although the comptrol-
ler is relying on British-American to justify denying prior-contract status to two-party con-
tracts, it appears that such a change in policy is subject to challenge. This is particularly
likely in view of the comptroller's statement with respect to a prior version of this rule, that
the rule "applies to two-party contracts as well as the traditional three-party contracts," as
well as apparent lack of legislative authority for the change. See 13 Tex. Reg. 1340 (Mar.
18, 1988).
120. 20 Tex. Reg. 1009 (1995), adopted 20 Tex. Reg. 3839 (1995) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319(a)(2)). This change brings the rule into con-
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and allow the exemption for contracts with open price terms.121 The
amendment to Rule 3.319 continues to provide that any renewal or exten-
sion of an option to extend the terms will be considered a new contract
and deletes previous specific references to "renegotiation of terms" being
considered a new contract. 122
The comptroller also amended several rules regarding taxable services.
The comptroller adopted amendments to the rules concerning data
processing services, security services, information services, credit report-
ing services, debt collection services, insurance services and real property
services to allow separation of nontaxable charges for unrelated services
after a contract for taxable services has been executed.123 The comptrol-
ler also amended the rule concerning motor vehicle parking and storage
to reflect current comptroller policy on the taxability of charges for park-
ing and storage services of vehicles when the services include transporta-
tion charges. 124
Numerous amendments have been adopted or proposed in response to
the statutory amendments to the Tax Code by the Seventy-Fourth Legis-
lature. Rule 3.354 was amended to impose tax on the processing fee
charged by a person collecting a dishonored check.125 In December of
1995 the comptroller issued a draft of a proposed amendment to the rule
concerning information services to reflect the statutory exemption for in-
formation provided to a homeowners association member. 26 A draft of
a proposed amendment to Rule 3.356 concerning real property services,
was issued to incorporate legislative changes that exclude services
purchased by a contractor in connection with the building of new resi-
formity with Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 27,421 (June 26, 1991), 2 [TEx.] ST. TAX
REP. (CCH) 401-540 (holding that prior contract exemption does not require both par-
ties' signature).
121. 20 Tex. Reg. 1009 (1995), adopted 20 Tex. Reg. 3839 (1995) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319(c)(4)). This amendment provides that a con-
tract would not lose its prior contract exemption solely due to a change in price if the
parties intend that the contract shall remain binding regardless of the change in price and
the contract does not expressly provide that changes in price terminate the contract. See
also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 26,510 (Oct. 2, 1991), 2 [TEx.] ST. TAX REP.
(CCH) 401-519.
122. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,263 (Jan. 12, 1993), 1993 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 3 (holding that the portion of Rule 3.319 which eliminated the prior contract ex-
emption for a renegotiated contract is invalid when the parties to the contract intended to
allow price increases pursuant to the terms of the contract).
123. 20 Tex. Reg. 1749 (1995) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 3.330, 3.333, 3.342, 3.343, 3.354, 3.355, 3.356); 20 Tex. Reg. 1762 (1995) (to be
codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357). See 1995 Tax Survey, supra
note 18, 1591 for a discussion of the amendments as proposed.
124. 20 Tex. Reg. 1328 (1995), adopted 20 Tex. Reg. 6333 (1995) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.315(a)). The amendment provides that if the
charge for parking and storage services either includes a charge for transportation services
or is in addition to a separately stated charge for transportation services, sales tax is due on
the entire charge, including any separately stated transportation charges.
125. 20 Tex. Reg. 8991 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 601 (1995) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.354).
126. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.342 (West 1995).
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dences and exclude lawn services provided by certain individuals. 127 Ad-
ditionally, a draft of a new Rule 3.363 has been proposed concerning
court reporting services to implement new legislation regarding taxation
of certain court reporting and video photography services.1 28 Generally
the proposed rule provides that court reporting services sold to a partici-
pant in a suit is a nontaxable service, but such services are taxable when
sold to nonparticipants. 129
The comptroller also issued a draft of several proposed amendments to
Rule 3.297 concerning carriers. 130 The amendments pertain to certain ex-
emptions relating to stevedoring companies, aircraft and engines, includ-
ing specific provisions regarding flight school aircraft, and the repair,
maintenance or restoration of rolling stock.131 The comptroller has pro-
posed amendments to the rule regarding natural gas and electricity in
order to conform to the legislative changes defining as noncommercial
use certain rolling stock and aircraft engine processing and repair and
expanding the definition of residential use. 132 The comptroller has also
proposed amendments to Rule 3.295 to set forth the comptroller's policy
that repairing tangible personal property of another is not exempt
processing133 and to implement a policy change waiving the requirement
for a predominate use study for certain exempt industries. 34
Amendments have been proposed to the manufacturing exemption to
extend the exemption to equipment leased for more than one year and to
implement the exemption added by the legislature for semiconductor
fabrication cleanrooms and equipment. 135 Likewise, proposed amend-
ments have been made to exclude from "real property repair and remod-
eling" those services that provide increased capacity in a production unit
in a petrochemical refinery or a chemical plant.136 Proposed amend-
ments have been made to Rule 3.296 concerning agriculture, animal life,
feed, seed, plants and fertilizer, in order to implement retroactively legis-
lative changes and a policy change restating the qualifications for "origi-
127. Draft of proposed revisions to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356 (Dec. 5, 1995) (on
file with the author). The draft of the proposed amendment adds a definition of contractor
and specifically includes a definition of residence or residential real property, and a list of
the type of services that are taxable real property services for residential or nonresidential
real property, which include landscaping, lawn and yard maintenance, the removal or col-
lection of garbage, building or grounds cleaning services, structural pest control service or
the surveying of real property.
128. Draft of proposed Rule 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.363 (Dec. 5, 1995) (on file with
the author). The comptroller states in the preamble of the draft of proposed Rule 3.363
that the changes codify long-term administrative policy concerning the taxation of court
reporting services. Id.
129. Id.
130. Draft of proposed revisions to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (Dec. 5, 1995) (on
file with author).
131. Id.
132. 20 Tex. Reg. 9379 (1995) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.295(a)(5),(8)).
133. Id. § 3.295(a)(7).
134. Id. § 3.295(e)(5).
135. 20 Tex. Reg. 10182 (1995) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300).
136. 20 Tex. Reg. 8598 (1995) (prop. to be codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.362).
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nal producer" to mean a person who produces at least fifty percent of the
products which are ultimately processed, packed or marketed. 37
Amendments were also proposed to implement recent legislative changes
adding exemptions for certain containers, bins or cages and for certain
pollution control equipment. 138
Proposed amendments to Rule 3.314 reflect the legislative exemption
for certain wrapping and packaging supplies used by newspapers and the
exemption for certain materials and supplies used in certain stevedoring
services. 139 The comptroller proposed amendments to Rule 3.284 con-
cerning drugs, medicines, medical equipment and devices to reflect the
legislative codification of a long-term administrative policy that exempts
hospital beds.140 The amended rule clarifies the requirements for a pa-
tient to qualify for an exemption to obtain a hot tub, spa or similar
appliance.' 4'
Proposed amendments to Rule 3.293 concerning food and food prod-
ucts reflect the legislature's repeal of the exemption for food products
sold to prison inmates and the legislative change which raised the maxi-
mum age of eligible members of certain nonprofit groups who can make
exempt food sales to 19.142 The comptroller also proposed an amend-
ment to the occasional sale rule to exempt certain sales by colleges and
student organizations and certain sales by senior citizen organizations. 143
Amendments have also been proposed to the resale provisions to im-
plement the statutory changes adopted by the legislature. One such pro-
posal would allow the acceptance of valid and properly completed resale
certificates from Mexican retailers.144 Additional proposed amendments
to Rule 3.285 conform to recent legislation and include the value of taxa-
ble items, the value of tangible personal property and the value of a taxa-
ble service, if a purchaser who gave a valid resale certificate makes a
divergent use. 145 Likewise, the comptroller has adopted a similar amend-
ment to the rule concerning exemption certificates. 146
137. 20 Tex. Reg. 8989 (1995) (prop. amend, to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.296).
138. Id. § 3.296(b).
139. 20 Tex. Reg. 8990 (1995) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.314(b)(2),(j)).
140. 20 Tex. Reg. 10745 (1995) (prop. amend, to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.284).
141. 19 Tex. Reg. 8098 (1995), adopted 20 Tex. Reg. 1337 (1995) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.284).
142. 20 Tex. Reg. 10748 (1995) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.293(b)(9),
(c)(2)(D)).
143. 20 Tex. Reg. 10749 (1995) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(j),(k)).
144. 20 Tex. Reg. 10368 (1995) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285). The
proposed amendment states that an acceptable form of resale certificate now includes a
Border States Uniform Sale for Resale Certificate. Id.
145. Id. (prop. amend, to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285(e)).





A. LIABILITY FOR TAX-DOING BUSINESS IN TEXAS
Some of the most significant challenges to the franchise tax during the
Survey period involved the validity of the tax itself rather than the ques-
tion of whether particular taxpayers were "doing business" for purposes
of the tax. Taxpayers challenged both the income tax component 147 and
the capital component 148 of the franchise tax. For example, in General
Dynamics Corp. v. Sharp149 the district court upheld the constitutionality
of the 1991 enactment of the earned surplus component of the franchise
tax. In 1992, General Dynamics recognized almost one billion dollars of
income from the completion of a long-term military aircraft manufactur-
ing contract. General Dynamics made several constitutional challenges
to the tax on earned surplus, including arguing that: (1) the addition of
the earned surplus tax to the franchise tax statute was an unconstitutional
retroactive income tax because it was based in part on income and re-
ceipts recognized prior to the passage or effective date of the law; (2) the
single-factor gross receipts formula violates due process, equal protection
and discriminates against interstate commerce; (3) the tax discriminates
against the taxpayer because it used the completed contract method of
accounting for federal income tax purposes; and (4) the tax violates equal
protection and uniform taxation mandates. 50 The court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the state and General Dynamics has ap-
pealed.' 5 ' In addition, several comptroller hearings have upheld the
taxable capital portion of the Texas franchise tax.152
Since the tax applies only to corporations and certain other entities that
do business in Texas, taxpayers continue relying on trusts, partnerships
and reorganizations in an effort to mitigate the effect of Texas' franchise
tax. 153 Fortunately for Texas businesses, significant tax planning opportu-
nities remain.' 54
147. The income component, officially called the "earned surplus" component (for the
tax purists), is a 4.5% tax on a taxpayer's earned surplus apportioned to Texas and is com-
puted by reference to federal income, as modified in accordance with the Texas Tax Code.
See generally, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.002, 171.106, 171.110 (Vernon 1992 & Supp.
1996).
148. The taxable capital component is a .25% tax on a taxpayer's taxable capital appor-
tioned to Texas. See generally, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.002, 171.106 (Vernon 1992).
The amount of a taxpayer's tax liability is, for practical purposes, the greater of the earned
surplus component and the taxable capital component.
149. No. 9211498 (353rd Dist. Ct. Travis County, Tex., Apr. 13, 1995), appeal pending.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 31,578, 32,016, 32,017, 32,018 (Feb.
10, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS 56 (holding that the capital-based component of the Texas
franchise tax does not violate Public Law 86-272 because the tax is not measured by net
income); see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,873 (Mar. 7, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax
LEXIS 139 (similar facts and holding).
153. See 1995 Tax Survey, supra note 18, at 1591-93 for a discussion of some of the more
common planning alternatives.
154. The legislature faces a difficult-and continuing-challenge in its efforts to revamp
the franchise tax while simultaneously keeping Texas an attractive home for businesses.
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B. CALCULATION AND ALLOCATION OF TAXABLE CAPITAL AND
EARNED SURPLUS
In a significant taxpayer victory, Decisions 27,377 and 27,378 held that
the comptroller could not require the corporate taxpayer to use push-
down accounting on the facts of that case. 155 The decisions point out that
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") do not require the
corporate taxpayer to use push-down accounting and that, because sec-
tion 171.109 of the Tax Code required only that the taxpayer employ
GAAP principles, the comptroller may not by rule limit the taxpayer to
only one GAAP principle. 156 The legislature has since prohibited the use
of push-down accounting.' 5 7 Likewise, the comptroller has amended
Rule 3.547 to prohibit the use of push-down accounting in computing sur-
plus on reports due on or after January 1, 1994.158
Several recent comptroller decisions have focused on the types of ac-
counting changes the comptroller will permit. In Decision 30,118 the
comptroller correctly held acceptable a pre-planned conversion from the
double declining balance method of depreciation to the straight line
method in accordance with the depreciation rules under the Internal Rev-
enue Code. 159 The tax division argued that this automatic change consti-
tuted choosing a different method of accounting, so that a corporation
could not make such a change more than once every four years without
the comptroller's consent. This is one of several recent cases that focused
on permitted accounting changes. 160
For example, the debate continues as to whether the legislature should impose the
franchise tax on trusts and partnerships. Although these entities are sometimes formed to
minimize franchise tax, it is also noteworthy that much investment in Texas property is
currently through such entities-and has been through such entities since well before the
earned surplus component of the franchise tax was enacted.
155. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 27,377 & 27,378 (Mar. 24, 1993), 2 [TEx.]
ST. TAX REP. 401-701.
156. Id. at 25,828. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon 1992); see also Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 29,404 & 29,405 (Nov. 30, 1993), 1993 Tex. Tax LEXIS 288 (de-
nying taxpayer's request to amend returns to use historical cost basis for 1987 report year,
rather than push-down basis; contrasting taxpayer-favorable decisions); Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 27,072 (June 8, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax. LEXIS 277 (similar facts and
holding).
157. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(m) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
158. 20 Tex. Reg. 1277 (Feb. 21, 1995) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.547 (Taxable Capital: Accounting Methods)). For periods prior to 1994,
the corporation should use either the push-down method or historical cost method, but
(according to the comptroller) not negative push-down.
159. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,118 (Apr. 14, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
231.
160. Id. at *7; see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,592 (May 9, 1995), 1995
Tex. Tax LEXIS 244 (same conclusion with respect to change of depreciation method to a
hybrid method, using double declining balance method until the midpoint of the asset's
service life and then changing to straight line); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 26,765
(Nov. 2, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 424 (permitting taxpayers to switch from units of
production depreciation to the double declining balance; proposed administrative decision
had ruled for state on this point); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,831 (Oct. 12,
1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 441 (finding changes in length of estimated useful life and
salvage value not permitted as change of accounting method); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
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Pennzoil Co. v. Sharp,16 1 which the parties settled is triggering changes
in comptroller policy on apportionment of gross receipts for franchise tax
purposes. Pennzoil had received a multi-million dollar judgment and,
pursuant to the comptroller's rules, was required to allocate the entire
award to Texas, thereby dramatically skewing its Texas receipts factor. 162
As a result of a summary judgment for Pennzoil based on the agreed final
judgment, the court held that the rule which apportions litigation awards
to the commercial domicile of the recipient corporation is contrary to the
Tax Code and invalid. 163 Pennzoil was allowed, therefore, to apportion
its litigation award based on the location of the payor, that is, the legal
domicile of the entity paying the award. This decision resulted in a
$23,000,000 refund to Pennzoil and the parties agreed to waive their right
to appeal or challenge the final judgment. 164 Comptroller representatives
have indicated that the Comptroller will be reviewing and may revise
some of the franchise tax apportionment rules, although no revisions had
been adopted by the end of the Survey period.
A significant number of decisions addressed the computation of taxa-
ble capital for franchise tax purposes. Decision 31,669 for example, in-
volved a taxpayer who wrote off the stock in two subsidiaries as
worthless. 65 Under Rule 3.405 as then in effect, a direct write-off of an
asset requires that a "specifically identifiable event" have occurred. 166
The administrative law judge concluded that the "specifically identifiable
event" required under the rule is the actual dissolution of the subsidiar-
ies.167 The taxpayer did not show that the subsidiaries were legally dis-
solved; therefore, the value of the taxpayer's investment, in the
subsidiaries could not be written-off for franchise tax purposes. Similarly,
in Decision 27,866 the comptroller held that a corporation could not
write-off, for franchise tax purposes, the values of its shell subsidiaries.168
The tax division argued that the losses in the shells were unrealized and
could not be written off because the subsidiaries remained in existence,
Hearing No. 29,757 (Sept. 21, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 349 (permitting conversion from
units of production to double declining balance); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
28,893 (Aug. 16, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 374 (addressing accelerated depreciation ver-
sus straight-line; inquiry focused in part on whether taxpayer's first set of amended returns
related back to the original filing date).
161. No. 9400974 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Mar. 3, 1995) (Agreed Final
Jmt., Mar. 3, 1995).
162. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.403(e)(8) (Vernon 1995) (as then in effect); for cur-
rent versions of the apportionment rules, see 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (West 1996)(Taxable Capital: Apportionment) and id. § 3.557 (Earned Surplus: Apportionment).
163. Pennzoil, No. 9400974 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Mar. 3, 1995) (Agreed
Final Jmt., Mar. 3, 1995).
164. Id.
165. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,669 (June 30, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS
295.
166. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405 (currently 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.551(e)(10)
(West 1996)).
167. 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS 295, at *7-8.
168. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 27,866 (Apr. 30, 1992), 2 [TEX.] ST. TAX REP.
(CCH) 1 401-596.
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and the comptroller concluded that the shells had some residual value.169
In a debt-equity case raising an issue of first impression, the comptrol-
ler addressed whether the existence of a conversion provision requires a
mandatorily-redeemable preferred stock to be considered equity, as op-
posed to debt. Decision 32,536 involved a taxpayer that issued shares of
convertible preferred stock that had a mandatory redemption provision
and an optional conversion provision. The administrative law judge de-
termined that, at the end of each calendar year at issue, the taxpayer had
no way of knowing how much of the preferred stock might be converted
to common stock, and thus how much the taxpayer would be relieved of
redeeming in cash. The judge therefore concluded that the stock did not
meet the statutory definition of debt in that the convertibility provision
was a contingency that made the redemption obligation less than certain
in amount. 170
In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sharp,171 one of the most significant decisions
rendered during the Survey period, the court concluded that Caterpillar
could deduct from its surplus certain retirement obligations. Caterpillar
had argued that ERISA bars the state from including certain post-retire-
ment benefit obligation accounts in its taxable capital franchise tax base
and that the accounts at issue were "debt" and thus should be excluded
from taxable surplus in determining Texas franchise tax.172 The district
court granted Caterpillar summary judgment. According to the comp-
troller's newsletter 173 the state currently does not plan to pay any related
refunds unless the state loses all appeals, although the newsletter notes
that refund claims should be addressed to the Refund Claims Verification
Section in Revenue Accounting. Numerous administrative decisions ad-
dress the same or similar issues, but hold in favor of the comptroller.
174
169. Id. at 25,473.
170. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,536 (Feb. 23, 1995), 2 [TEx.] ST. TAX REP.
(CCH) 1 401-850.
171. No. 93-11176 (299th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Mar. 23, 1995), appeal pending.
172. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sharp, No. 9311176 (229th Dist. Ct. Travis County, Tex., Oct. 28,
1994) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgment).
173. TAX POLIcY NEWS, Apr. 1995, at 4-5. Oral argument on the appeal was scheduled
for early 1996.
174. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,669 (June 30, 1995), 1995 Tex.
Tax LEXIS 295 (prepaid pension assets; the amount by which the fair value of the pension
plan assets exceeded the accumulated benefit obligations are includible in taxable surplus);
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,659 (Jan. 17, 1995), 1995 Tex. Tax LEXIS 54
(overfunded pension amounts were held not to qualify as debt under TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996) and were thus included in taxable surplus);
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,634 (Nov. 22, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 538
(various accounts, including accrued vacation pay, royalties, product liability and others,
not excludable from surplus); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,359 (Oct. 7, 1994),
1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 483 (pension liability account, vacation pay liability account are not
debt within meaning of TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a)(3)); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 30,563 (Oct. 28, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS 511 (taxpayer not entitled to
deduct unfunded employee benefit accounts, including pension plan, vested vacation,
worker's compensation and other plans from surplus); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing
No. 31,153 (Oct. 7, 1994), 2 [TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 401-838 (holding that prepaid
pension assets booked as non-current assets, in accordance with GAAP and FASB 87,
must be included in surplus).
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Similarly, numerous comptroller decisions support the comptroller's view
that operating lease obligations are not considered debt for franchise tax
purposes and may not be deducted from surplus.175
In Central Power and Light Co. v. Sharp,176 the court focused on
whether allocation for funds used during construction is debt. The tax-
payer, a regulated utility, argued that it should be allowed to exclude
from surplus capitalized interest on equity funds for construction projects
(AFUDC), which are taken into account in setting taxpayer's rates. The
taxpayer also argued that the comptroller's position created a violation of
the constitutional requirement of equal and uniform taxes in that GAAP
required different accounting for regulated and non-regulated companies,
and that the legislature unconstitutionally delegated its authority to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) by adopting a GAAP
standard. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
comptroller and the taxpayer has appealed. 177
Other decisions address issues raised in the context of affiliated groups
of corporations. Decision 26,610 for example, addresses the taxpayer's
investment in its subsidiary for purposes of determining surplus after the
investment was converted from the equity basis to the cost basis.178 De-
spite the taxpayer's argument that the comptroller's method of reporting
resulted in consolidated reporting, which is prohibited by the Tax Code,
the administrative law judge held that the pre-acquisition equity earnings
of a second-tier subsidiary are included in a parent corporation's sur-
plus.1 79 In Decision 32,584180 the administrative law judge found that a
dividend could not be excluded from surplus until the date of normal
declaration by the board, although book entries and intent to declare div-
idend occurred earlier.
175. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,701 (June 28, 1995), 1994 Tex.
Tax LEXIS 209 (no deduction from surplus allowed for operating lease obligations). Texas
Utilities Electric Co. v. Sharp, No. 9307563 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.), filed June
23, 1993, is one of many cases still pending in which taxpayers have challenged the comp-
troller's assertion that operating lease obligations are not "debt" within the meaning of
section 171.109(a)(3) of the Texas Tax Code and therefore may not be deducted from
surplus.
176. No. 912800 (147th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 21, 1994), appeal pending.
177. By contrast, the legislature based franchise tax calculations on the Internal Reve-
nue Code as of a particular date. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(b)(5) (Vernon Supp.
1996).
178. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 26,610 (July 11, 1995), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS
270.
179. Id. at *4-6.
180. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,584 (Dec. 29, 1994), 1994 Tex. Tax LEXIS
594; see also TAX POLICY NEWS, Aug. 1994 at 5, (noting that dividends are excluded from
taxable capital as of the date of declaration if they are declared in accordance with the
state of incorporation law and are paid within one year); TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.109(f) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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C. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AND CORRESPONDING REGULATORY
DEVELOPMENTS
Several significant franchise tax amendments are in Senate Bill 644.181
For example section 171.063 of the Tax Code, amended to expand the
nonprofit corporation exemption from franchise tax, now includes corpo-
rations exempted under Internal Revenue Code sections 501(c)(8), (10)
or (19).182 A new section 171.087 exempts nonprofit corporations organ-
ized for student loan funds or student scholarship purposes.183 Section
171.082, regarding the nonprofit corporation exemption for certain home-
owners' associations, clarifies that in order to qualify for exemption, the
owners of individual lots, residences or residential units must control at
least 51% of the votes of the corporation. Voting control cannot be held
by a single individual or family or developers, declarants, banks, investors
or similar parties, and to provide a definition of "residential."'184
The legislature "clarified" the meaning of a business loss by amending
Section 171.110(e) 185 to provide that a business loss is any negative
amount after apportionment and allocation. In September 1995, the
comptroller informally issued a draft proposed amendment to Rule 3.555
to reflect this legislation. The draft rule also includes a restriction prohib-
iting a corporation from conveying, assigning or transferring a business
loss to another entity, including by merger.'8 6
Other changes affecting the calculation of the franchise tax include
amendments to Section 171.112.187 These changes require a corporation,
except as otherwise provided, to use the same accounting methods to ap-
portion its taxable capital as are used to compute its taxable capital.'88
Revised section 171.1531189 precludes a refund to the survivor of a
merger of franchise tax that was paid by nonsurvivors; only credits
against tax computed on net taxable capital will be allowed. In response
to this legislation, and 1991 legislation, the comptroller issued a draft of a
proposed new Rule 3.577 in September 1995190, which provides that the
surviving corporation of a merger may not take a credit under section171.0021.191
181. 74th Leg., R.S., (1002), 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5033 (Vernon) (generally eff. Jan.
1, 1996, and applying to reports originally due on or after that date).
182. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.063 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
183. Id § 171.087.
184. Id. § 171.082.
185. Id § 171.110(e).
186. If proposed, the amendments would be proposed to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.555
(Earned Surplus: Computation) [hereinafter Draft Proposal] (on file with author).
187. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.112 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
188. Id.
189. Id. § 171.1531.
190. If proposed, the new rule would be proposed as 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.577
(Credit for Sales Tax Paid on Property Used in Manufacturing). The rule also addresses
the sales tax credit.
191. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0021 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996) (temporary credit
for sales tax paid on property used in manufacturing for tax paid by a non-surviving entity).
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The legislature also amended section 171.203, with respect to the filing
of a public information report, imposing the requirement to send a copy
of the report to each person named in the report who is not currently
employed by the corporation or a related corporation.192 In addition, a
certification by an officer or director that the information is true and cor-
rect to the best of their knowledge and that copies have been sent to the
required persons is required to be included on the report. 193
Although the Tax Code is drafted to follow GAAP (and its changes),
the legislature defined the Internal Revenue Code at a single point in
time, thereby requiring taxpayers to calculate their franchise taxes by ref-
erence to calculations of federal income tax under an outdated Internal
Revenue Code. 194 To eliminate this problem (although only temporar-
ily), the legislature amended section 171.001195 to update the definition of
Internal Revenue Code to a more current version; without this amend-
ment, more taxpayers would have been required to continue preparing
two sets of tax computations-one for federal tax under the current In-
ternal Revenue Code, and another set under the old Internal Revenue
Code for franchise tax purposes. The statutory changes to the franchise
tax provisions also define "beginning date,"'196 which is used in reference
to the definition of "privilege period" in section 171.151197 and the deter-
mination of the applicable tax reporting and filing time periods of sec-
tions 171.152,198 171.153199 and 171.1532. 200 The draft amendment to
Rule 3.555201 will incorporate this legislation updating the reference to
the Internal Revenue Code. Likewise, drafts have been issued proposing
amendments to update the definition of Internal Revenue Code in the
following rules: Rule 3.556;202 Rule 3.558;203 and Rule 3.562.204
Faced with significant taxpayer concerns that section 171.1061205 would
regularly be used to allocate receipts from stock sales to Texas, the comp-
troller has provided taxpayers with limited assurances that most income
will be "presumed" unitary, and that his efforts to tax income under this
section will focus more on sourcing "nowhere income" to Texas than on
192. Id § 171.203 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
193. Id.
194. See id. § 171.001(b)(5).
195. Id. Several rule amendments were proposed or adopted with respect to this
change; see, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.548 (West 1996) (Taxable Capital: Close & S
Corps).
196. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
197. Id. § 171.151.
198. Id. § 171.152.
199. Id. § 171.153.
200. Id. § 171.1532.
201. Draft Proposal, supra note 186.
202. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.556 (Earned Surplus: S Corporations) (draft).
203. Id. § 3.558 (Earned Surplus: Officer and Director Compensation) (draft).
204. Id. § 3.562 (Limited Liability Companies) (draft).
205. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1061 (Vernon Supp. 1996). This section provides that
the comptroller may allocate all of certain income, excluding interest and dividends, to




sourcing income to Texas in other circumstances. 206 The comptroller's
draft Rule 3.576207 presumes that all income to be unitary income and
includes the following factors to determine whether income is unitary:
centralization of management, functional integration and economies of
scale. The draft rule also proposes that income may be allocated only
when the income is investment, rather than operational and provides
guidelines for the allocation of non-unitary income and related
expenses.20 8
Another statutory amendment to the Tax Code provides that a corpo-
ration declaring a dividend shall exclude those dividends from its taxable
capital and the corporation receiving dividends shall include those divi-
dends in its gross receipts and taxable capital as of the earlier of: (1) the
date the dividend is declared, if actually paid within one year of declara-
tion; or (2) the date the dividend is actually paid. 20 9
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF TAX/EXEMPTIONS
Many of the important cases decided during the Survey period con-
cerned exemptions. Several of these cases highlight that courts continue
struggling to define concrete guidelines for use in determining when
goods involved in interstate commerce can be subjected to property tax.
The Texas Supreme Court in Virginia Indonesia Co. v. Harris County Ap-
praisal District210 held that goods purchased by an agent for a foreign
entity and transported to Texas solely for inspection, approval and pack-
aging are exempt from property taxes pursuant to the Import-Export
Clause of the United States Constitution.21' The taxpayer, a Delaware
corporation, purchased goods from vendors located in the United States
for export to Indonesia on behalf of an Indonesian joint venture. Upon
purchase, the goods were transported from the vendors to an independ-,
ent export packer in Houston. The export packer then checked the goods
to confirm that the proper items were shipped and that the goods met
specifications. Upon approval by the export packer, an international
agency inspected the goods on behalf of the Indonesian joint venture.
The goods were then packaged and shipped to Indonesia. In most in-
stances, the goods remained in Houston for no longer than 45 days,




209. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(f) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
210. 910 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1995),
211. Id. at 915; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. The court also concluded that property
tax on the goods at issue would violate the "one voice" policy of the Import-Export Clause
because the tax has the potential of interfering with the United States' relations with Indo-
nesia in that Indonesia, in response to the property tax, might decide to purchase goods
from another country or adopt retaliatory tariffs. 910 S.W.2d at 914-15.
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although in exceptional circumstances the goods remained in Houston for
up to 175 days.
The appraisal district asserted that the taxpayer owed property taxes
on the goods located at the export packer's Houston facility on January 1,
1991. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Import-Ex-
port Clause applies. 212 The court applied the "stream of export" doc-
trine, which provides that goods are not subject to tax once exportation
has commenced. 213 The court concluded that goods which have begun
the export process retain their export status as long as the goods remain
in transit, and that temporary interruptions to the in-transit process do
not take goods out of export status if the interruption is due to necessities
of the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience.2 14 However,
stoppages that serve the owner's business purpose interrupt the goods' in-
transit status. 215 In applying these principles, the court reasoned that the
exportation process had begun after the taxpayer purchased the goods
and that the stoppage in Houston was attributable to the exportation pro-
cess and not a business purpose.216
Other cases decided during the Survey period illustrate that property
tax exemptions are interpreted strictly against the party claiming the ex-
emption. Mission Palms Retirement Housing, Inc. v. Hidalgo County Ap-
praisal District 17 is a prime example. In this case, Mission Palms, a
section 501(c)(3) organization, claimed that its property was exempt
under the charitable organization exemption set forth in section 11.18 of
the Tax Code.218 The appraisal district denied the exemption because it
212. 910 S.W.2d at 915.
213. Id. at 908. Exploration commences when goods "have been shipped, or entered
with a common carrier for transportation to another state, or have been started upon such
transportation in a continuous route or journey." Id.
214. Id. In his dissent, Justice Hecht (joined by Justice Owen) argued that in-transit
goods can be taxed without necessarily violating the Import-Export Clause. The dissent
asserted that in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court abandoned the "in-transit" rule employed by the majority. Virginia Indo-
nesia Co., 910 S.W.2d at 915.
215. Id. at 908.
216. Id. at 914. In another case addressing property taxation of goods in interstate com-
merce, the Court of Appeals in Houston [1st Dist.] held that an unapportioned property
tax on shipping containers, which were frequently present in the district but which were
used exclusively in foreign commerce, violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Transamerica Container Leasing, Inc., No.
01-90-00768-CV, 1995 WL 555899 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1995, no writ) (not
designated for publication) (citing Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 U.S. 1095
(1993)). See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation: Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU
L. REV. 1649, 1668 n.175 (1994) [hereinafter, 1994 Tax Survey]. In Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Plexchem Int'l, Inc., No. 14-94-00417-CV, 1995 WL 505962 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.], writ requested) (not designated for publication), the Houston Court of Ap-
peals [14th Dist.] held that property tax on plastic resin pellets stored in a customs-bonded
warehouse in Houston while awaiting shipment to other countries did not violate the Com-
merce Clause or the Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution.
217. 896 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
218. Mission Palms also asserted that denial of an exemption would violate the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 822. Mission Palms' position
was that federal laws governing public-housing loans are so comprehensive that Congress
effectively preempted all state laws which might apply to HUD loan recipients. Id. The
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believed that the dissolution provision of the Mission Palms' articles of
incorporation did not comply with Section 11.18(f)(2)(A) of the Tax
Code. 219 Among other requirements, this section provides that in order
to qualify for the exemption, the organization's charter, bylaws or other
regulations must direct that its assets be transferred to the state or to
another educational, religious, charitable, or similar Section 501(c)(3) or-
ganization upon dissolution. Although Mission Palms' articles of incor-
poration generally provided for conveyance of its assets to another
educational or charitable Section 501(c)(3) organization on dissolution,
the articles also stated that Mission Palms could transfer its assets to the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in satisfaction of "any in-
debtedness" to HUD.220 The court held that because the language al-
lowing transfers to HUD did not limit transfers to the amount of Mission
Palms' indebtedness to HUD, the provision violated a strict construction
of section 11.18(f)(2)(A).221
The Texas Supreme Court held in Corpus Christi People's Baptist
Church Inc. v. Nueces County Appraisal District222 that Section 11.433 of
the Tax Code, which allows religious organizations to file applications for
exemptions six years later than other entities qualifying for exemptions,
does not violate the Texas Constitution.223 The appraisal district asserted
that section 11.433 operated to extinguish an existing tax debt, thereby
violating Article III, section 52 of the Texas Constitution.224 The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the statute operates as a statute
of limitation tolling period, and does not extinguish tax debts.225
B. PROCEDURE
There were numerous cases during the Survey period addressing mo-
tions under section 25.25(c) and (d) of the Tax Code. Section 25.25(c)
provides that at any time before the end of five years after the beginning
of a tax year, the appraisal review board, on the motion of either the
appraisal district or the taxpayer, may change the appraisal roll to correct
court concluded that conformity with Section 11.18 does not prevent compliance with the
HUD legislation; thus, the Supremacy Clause does not apply in the facts at hand. Id. at
822-23.
219. Id.; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(f)(2)(A) (Vernon 1992).
220. Mission Palms, 896 S.W.2d at 821.
221. Id. The court arguably takes the strict construction approach too far in this case.
It appears that Mission Palms would have prevailed in this case had its articles provided
that it could convey assets to HUD in satisfaction of "its" indebtedness to HUD rather
than stating that it could convey assets to HUD in satisfaction of "any" indebtedness to
HUD. Although the court correctly concludes that a literal reading of this language could
conceivably allow Mission Palms to convey assets to HUD to satisfy a debt of another to
HUD, it defies logic that Mission Palms desired or intended to pay others' debts to HUD.
In order to achieve an equitable result, it seems that the court could have strained just
slightly to interpret the language "any indebtedness to [HUD]" to mean indebtedness of
Mission Palms to HUD.
222. 904 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1995).





(1) certain clerical errors, (2) multiple appraisals of a property for the tax
year, or (3) the inclusion of property on the roll that does not exist in the
form or at the location described in the roll.226 Section 25.25(d) allows a
taxpayer or the chief appraiser to file a motion with the appraisal review
board at any time prior to the tax delinquency date, requesting the board
to change the roll to correct an error that resulted in an incorrect ap-
praisal.227 No error, however, may be corrected under section 25.25(d)
unless the error results in the appraised value exceeding the correct value
by more than one-third.228
In Harris County Appraisal District v. World Houston, Inc.,229 the tax-
payer filed a motion under section 25.25(d) concerning the tax value of its
property but did not receive a satisfactory determination from the ap-
praisal review board and filed suit challenging the determination. The
trial court referred the parties to binding arbitration pursuant to section
42.225 of the Tax Code and adopted the arbitrator's findings, which ap-
parently were favorable to the taxpayer.230 The appraisal district ap-
pealed, asserting that the trial court erred in adopting such findings
because the Tax Code does not authorize the arbitration remedy for a
property owner appealing from an appraisal review board's determina-
tion under section 25.25. The appraisal district claimed that the arbitra-
tion procedure is available only if the taxpayer is appealing an appraisal
review board's determination of a protest filed under chapter 41 of the
Tax Code and, thus, is not available for section 25.25 motions.231 The
Houston Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that because section 42.01
of the Tax Code, which sets forth the circumstances in which a taxpayer
may appeal under Chapter 42, does not make any mention of section
25.25, the arbitration procedures under Chapter 42 of the Tax Code are
not available in connection with litigation relating to section 25.25 mo-
226. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996). Motions under§ 25.25 are made by taxpayers in circumstances in which the taxpayer failed to file a timely
protest with the appraisal review board under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.41, failed to
timely file suit after an adverse appraisal review board decision on a protest, or failed to
appear at the protest hearing.
227. Id. § 25.25(d).
228. Id.
229. 905 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
230. Id at 595. Section 42.225 (as in effect with respect to the tax years at issue) pro-
vided that a property owner who appeals an appraisal review board order under Chapter
42 of the Tax Code is entitled to have the appeal resolved through binding arbitration.
Amendments to section 42.225 provide that arbitration conducted pursuant to the section
is non-binding. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.225 (Vernon 1992), amended by Act of 1993,
73d Leg., R.S. (1031), § 9, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4440, 4441 (1993). Indeed, in Hayes County
Appraisal District v. Mayo Kirby Springs, Inc., 903 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995,
n.w.h.), the Austin Court of Appeals held that the prior version of Section 42.225, requiring
binding arbitration if requested by the taxpayer, violated the open courts provision of the
Texas Constitution. Id. at 396-97; see also TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 13. Both Mayo Kirby and
Williamson County Appraisal District v. Nootsie, Ltd., 905 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Austin
1995, n.w.h.), confirm that appraisal districts have standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity of certain Tax Code provisions. Mayo Kirby, 903 S.W.2d at 397.
231. World Houston, 905 S.W.2d at 595 (relying upon TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.01-
41.70 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996)).
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tions.232 Indeed, the court in dicta indicated that the trial court's review
of an appraisal review board's decision concerning a section 25.25 motion
should only be in the context of compelling the board to perform the
functions required of it by section 25.25.233
The Dallas Court of Appeals in Dallas Central Appraisal District v.
G.T.E. Directories Corp.234 considered whether property was eligible for
corrective relief under section 25.25(c)(3) because it did not exist in the
form or at the location described in the roll. The dispute concerned the
1988 and 1989 tax years, and the taxpayer claimed that due to foundation
defects existing in those years, the property was useless at that time
rather than being in 99% good condition as shown on the appraisal dis-
trict's commercial worksheets (the worksheets also incorrectly indicated
that the building had three stories rather than two). The taxpayer as-
serted that it was eligible for relief under section 25.25(c)(3) because the
property was not "in the form" described on the appraisal roll. The trial
court agreed with the taxpayer, and lowered the property's value from
almost $4.5 million to approximately $550,000 for 1988 and approxi-
mately $280,000 for 1989.235 The court of appeals reversed, however, rea-
soning that the error at issue was an overstatement of appraised value,
and that the property's appraised value is not a description of the "form"
of the property. 236 Indeed, the court indicated that the term "form" in
the context of section 25.25(c) refers only to whether the property is
listed on the tax rolls correctly as real property, personal property, a real
property improvement or some other physical description shown on the
roll.2 3
7
The Texas Supreme Court in Syntax, Inc. v. Hall 38 held that taxing
232. Id. In another case concerning section 25.25(d), the Dallas Court of Appeals held
that the taxpayer was not barred from employing section 25.25(d) by virtue of filing a
protest, which had later been withdrawn, on the relevant property for the year in question.
Jim Sowell Construction Co. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, 900 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied). Section 25.25(d) provides that the tax roll cannot be
changed under section 25.25(d) if the property was the subject of a protest. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 25.25(d) (Vernon 1992). The court concluded that because there was never a
hearing on the protest, it was not the subject of a protest. Jim Sowell, 900 S.W.2d at 86.
233. World Houston, 905 S.W.2d at 597. The court's dicta is highly questionable. Par-
ties generally have a right to judicial review of an administrative decision, and there is
nothing in the Tax Code which prevents taxpayers from seeking judicial review of an ap-
praisal review board's decision on a section 25.25 motion. See Schwantz v. Texas Dept. of
Pub. Safety, 415 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ ref'd).
234. 905 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
235. Id. at 319.
236. Id. at 323. This case is contrary to the dicta in World Houston indicating that judi-
cial review of section 25.25 motions is limited to determining whether the appraisal review
board performed its functions because the court in G.T.E Directories considered the merits
of the issue concerning whether section 25.25(c)(3) applies in the facts at hand. See also,
Himont U.S.A., Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 904 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (court also considered whether Section 25.25(c)(3) applies).
237. G.TE. Directories, 905 S.W.2d at 321. In another case concerning section
25.25(c)(3), the Houston Court of Appeals [1st Dist.] held that the taxpayer's failure to
render personal property does not prevent the taxpayer from relying on section 25.25(c)(3)
to the extent the section is otherwise applicable. Himont US.A., 904 S.W.2d at 744.
238. 899 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1995).
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units cannot profit from excess proceeds derived from the sale of prop-
erty taken in satisfaction of a judgment for delinquent taxes even if the
resale occurs after the two-year redemption period under section 34.21 of
the Tax Code. 239 Rather, the excess proceeds must be deposited with the
court for distribution to the former property owner.240 In Syntax, the
county and school district secured a judgment against the property owner,
foreclosed and conducted a tax sale. No bids were received and the prop-
erty was "struck off" to the school district for the amount of delinquent
taxes. More than two years later, the property was sold for $42,000 more
than the total tax bill and costs. The taxing units claimed that they were
entitled to these excess proceeds, relying on section 34.01, which provides
that when taxing units take title to property in the absence of a sufficient
bid at the foreclosure sale, the taxing unit's title includes "all the interest
owned by the defendant ... subject only to the defendant's right of re-
demption."' 241 The court disagreed, concluding that this section does not
extinguish the landowner's rights to excess proceeds on sale, as provided
in section 34.06.242
In W. V Grant Evangelistic Association, Inc. v. Dallas Central Appraisal
District 43 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the provision in section
42.08(b) of the Tax Code providing that taxpayers forfeit their right to
appeal if they have not paid the proper amount of taxes prior to the de-
linquency date, violates the Texas Constitution. 2"4 The taxpayer had filed
an application for exemption as a religious organization, but was denied
by the appraisal district and by the appraisal review board. The taxpayer
then filed suit, but failed to tender the amount required under section
42.08(b) before the delinquency date.245 (This minimum amount is the
greater of (a) the amount of taxes not in dispute, or (b) the amount of
taxes imposed on the property in the preceding year.246) Therefore, the
taxpayer failed to comply with the prepayment requirements of section
42.08 and the trial court dismissed the lawsuit.247 The taxpayer then filed
an amended petition, contending that section 42.08 is an unreasonable
239. Section 34.21 provides that the owner of real property sold at a tax sale may re-
deem the property within two years after the date on which the purchaser's deed is re-
corded by paying the purchaser the purchaser's bid for the property and certain costs, plus
25% of the aggregate total if the redemption occurs in the first year of the redemption
period and 50% of the aggregate total if the redemption occurs in the second year of the
redemption period. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.21 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
240. Syntax, 899 S.W.2d at 192.
241. Id. at 190; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01(a) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996).
242. Syntax, 899 S.W.2d at 192. The court noted that taxing units are not, and should
not be, in the business of buying and selling real estate for profit. Id. at 191.
243. 900 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ granted).
244. W.V. Grant, 900 S.W.2d at 791; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (persons have the right
to open courts).
245. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08(b) (Vernon 1992) (amended 1995). Section 42.08(b)
provides that a property owner forfeits its right to appeal an order of an appraisal review
board unless it pays a minimum amount of property taxes before the delinquency date.
246. Id. Taxpayers may also pay the entire tax bill without violating the voluntary pay-
ment rule. Id. § 42.08(b)(2).
247, W.V. Grant, 900 S.W.2d at 790.
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restriction on access to the courts and is therefore unconstitutional.248
The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that Section 42.08 violates the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution because the prepayment
requirement is an unreasonable financial barrier to court access.249 In
response to this case, the Texas Legislature added section 42.08(d), which
provides that a taxpayer may file an oath of inability to pay taxes, in
which case the requirement of prepayment of tax as a prerequisite to ap-
peal is waived. 250
Gregg County Appraisal District v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. ,251 ex-
emplifies the consequences of failing to satisfy the procedural require-
ments to filing suit on a property tax matter. The property at issue was
owned by "Four-S." "Four-S" appointed "Laidlaw Texas" as its desig-
nated agent for property tax purposes. However, the tax suit was filed by
"Laidlaw Delaware," which is the second-tier parent corporation of
Laidlaw Texas. At trial, the taxpayer was able to substantially reduce the
value of the property for tax purposes. The appraisal district, however,
appealed on the grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction, given
that neither the property owner nor its designated agent filed the lawsuit
within the 45-day time requirement set forth in section 42.21 of the Tax
Code.252 The trial court had rejected the jurisdiction argument on the
theory that the proper parties had ultimately been joined in the lawsuit
and that Laidlaw Delaware was the de facto agent of the property
owner.253 But the court of appeals reversed, stating that Laidlaw Texas
and Laidlaw Delaware are distinct and different entities, that no de facto
relationship had been established, and even if such a relationship had
been established, the statutory requirements for establishing an agent for
property tax purposes had not been met.254
248. Id.
249. Id. at 791. The court agreed that the prepayment requirement furthers the state's
interests in assuring that tax suits are not filed to allow taxpayers to delay or avoid paying
taxes. The court, however, believed that forfeiting one's right to sue is too severe a conse-
quence of failing to pay the taxes by the delinquency date. Id. The court noted that other
alternatives to the forfeiture provision might be accelerated administrative proceedings
and expedited trial settings. The taxpayer in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Harris
County Municipal Utility District Number 130, 899 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1995, no writ), had also not satisfied the prepayment requirements set forth in sec-
tion 42.08, asserting the unconstitutionality of section 42.08 after learning of the decision in
W.V. Grant. The constitutionality argument, however, had not been asserted at the trial
court level; therefore, the court of appeals held that the taxpayer had failed to preserve
error on the issue. Id. at 825. The court noted a constitutional violation can be considered
on appeal without proper preservation of error if the violation was not recognized before
the case was appealed. Id. Because the constitutionality claim was not novel, however, the
failure to preserve error in this case was fatal to the taxpayer, Id.
250. See TEX. TAX CODE ArNN. § 42.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
251. 907 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-yler 1995, writ denied).
252. Id. at 15; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21 (Vernon 1992).
253. Laidlaw Waste, 907 S.W.2d at 17.
254. Id. at 17-18. The court also ruled that past assessments can be admitted into evi-
dence on the issue of a property's value if there is sufficient evidence of the landowner's
participation in the prior year's proceedings. Id. at 21. If, however, there is not sufficient




The Seventy-Fourth Legislature passed nearly 50 bills relating to prop-
erty tax during its last term. Much of the legislation concerned exemp-
tions, with new exemptions being created (subject to voter approval in
certain circumstances) and others being modified in important re-
spects. 255 New sections 11.145 and 11.146 of the Tax Code exempt tangi-
ble personal property used in the production of income and mineral
interests with values less than $500.256 New section 11.13(q) and (r) of
the Tax Code enables the surviving spouse of a person who qualified for
the over-65 homestead exemption to benefit from the exemption if the
surviving spouse is at least 55 years old when the deceased spouse dies.257
An amendment to the Texas Constitution modifies the exemption for
property owned by disabled veterans. 258 Under the new exemption, dis-
abled veterans can receive up to a $15,000 exemption depending on their
percentage of disability.259 New section 23.51(7) adds wildlife manage-
ment to the list of uses that qualifies for open-space land.260 Amended
section 11.18(d)(5) allows property owned by a theater for the perform-
ing arts to qualify for the charitable organization exemption.2 61
Several important changes were made to statutes relating to tax abate-
ments. Most importantly, the sunset date for the tax abatement statute
was changed from September 1, 1995, to September 1, 2006.262 New sec-
tions 111.301 through 111.304 of the Tax Code provide that, if certain
conditions are met, a taxpayer entering into a tax abatement agreement
after January 1, 1996, is eligible for a rebate of sales and franchise taxes in
an amount equal to the property taxes that would have been abated by
the school district with jurisdiction over the relevant property had it
ted into evidence concerning the valuation issue. Id.; see Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
Fisher, 559 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
255. Voters rejected constitutional amendments which would have created an exemp-
tion for commercial fishing boats, and an exemption for certain Masonic lodges.
256. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.145, 11.146 (Vernon Supp. 1996). For these purposes,
all such property in a taxing unit is aggregated to determine if the $500 threshold is met.
Id.
257. Id. § 11.13(q), (r) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
258. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b), (d). This constitutional provision supersedes
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.22 (Vernon 1992).
259. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b), (d). The prior exemption capped at $3,000. TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 11.22 (Vernon 1992); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.031(a)
amended to allow eligible disabled persons to pay property taxes in quarterly installments.
Id. § 31.031(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
260. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51(7) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
261. Id. § 11.18(d)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The prior statute merely exempted prop-
erty owned by a theater for the dramatic arts. Id. § 11.18(d)(5) (Vernon 1992 & Supp.
1996), amended by Act of June 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., (781), § 4, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws
4046, 4049 (Vernon). New section 11.20(g) of the Tax Code expanded the religious organi-
zation exemption relating to improvements incomplete on January 1 of a tax year. Id.
§ 11.20(g).
262. Id. § 312.006 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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joined in the abatement. 263 These conditions include the abatee increas-
ing its payroll in the city or county granting the abatement by at least $3
million and increasing the appraised value of the abatee's property sub-
ject to the abatement agreement by at least $4 million.264 The total re-
bate to all taxpayers under this provision is capped at $10 million per
year.2
65
New section 312.204(f) of the Tax Code provides that abatement agree-
ments with property owners in an enterprise zone are not required to
contain identical terms for the percentage of abatement and the duration
of agreement.266 Absent this provision, abatement agreements entered
into by municipalities, counties, school districts and other jurisdictions
generally must have identical terms with respect to the abatement per-
centage and the duration of the agreement.267
The Texas Legislature adopted the County Development District Act,
which appears to offer significant revenue-raising opportunities for cer-
tain counties. 268 The statute governs counties with a population of not
more than 400,000, and provides that a county development district with
respect to any land in the county can be created in such a county if all of
the landowners in the proposed district petition for the district's creation
and the commissioners court grants the petition.269 Upon creation of the
district, a sales and use tax of up to one-half percent may be adopted if it
is approved at an election of voters in the district.270 This tax does not
count toward the limitation on sales taxes imposed by Chapter 323 of the
Tax Code 271 on counties, which generally limits county sales and use taxes
to one-half or one percent. 272 A county development district also has the
authority to issue bonds. 273
263. Id. § 111.301-.304. See also, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.210 (Vernon Supp. 1996)
(joint agreements by municipalities, counties and junior college districts to offer tax
abatements).
264. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 111.301(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
265. Id. § 111.302(a). There are other significant conditions to qualifying for the re-
bate. For example, the rebate does not apply if the school district with jurisdiction over the
subject property enters into the abatement agreement. Id. § 111.301(a)(3). In addition,
the taxpayer's refund is limited by the amount of franchise and sales taxes paid by it for the
year. Id. § 111.301(c). If the $10 million cap applies, the amount of each refund to the
claimants is reduced proportionately until the $10 million figure is reached. Id.
§ 111.302(c).
266. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.204(f) (Vernon Supp. 1996). This amendment pro-
vides important planning opportunities. Municipalities, counties and school districts often
do not agree on the percentage of abatement to be granted or the duration of abatement.
If this difficulty arises, taxpayers should consider whether an enterprise zone can be cre-
ated with respect to the subject property to avoid having these tax units agree on these
terms.
267. Id. § 312.206(a).
268. Id. §§ 312.601-312.640.
269. See id. §§ 312.605-312.610.
270. Id. § 312.637.
271. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 312.637(a).
272. Id. § 323.103.
273. Id. § 312.634. An interesting aspect of this Act is section 312.638, which provides
that the commissioners court on a unanimous vote may add or exclude property to or from
the district. Id. § 312.638. Query whether added property would be subject to the sales
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The Texas Legislature adopted several important procedural and ad-
ministrative provisions as well. New section 31.115 of the Tax Code effec-
tively repeals the voluntary payment rule274 by providing that payment of
a property tax is involuntary if the taxpayer indicates on the instrument
by which the tax is paid or in a document accompanying the payment that
the tax is paid under protest.275 In somewhat confusing legislation, new
sections 41.413 and 42.015 of the Tax Code provide that a lessee of per-
sonal or real property which is contractually obligated to reimburse the
property owner for taxes imposed on the property is entitled to protest
the property's appraised value if the owner does not file a protest, and is
entitled to appeal an order of the appraisal review board if the lessee
properly filed protest.276 This legislation also requires the property
owner to send the lessee a copy of any notice of the property's reap-
praisal the owner receives.2 77 Although the legislation does not provide a
remedy for the owner's failure to provide to the lessee notice of reap-
praisal, this legislation may pave the way for lessees disgruntled with the
tax bill to sue owners if the owner fails to provide the lessee with a notice
of reappraisal. In that regard, lessors may want to consider changing
their leases to provide that no damages apply if a notice of reappraisal is
not sent by the owner to the lessee.278
As in prior legislative sessions, changes were made relating to special
appraisal of agricultural land, open-space land, timber land and other
special appraisal categories. New sections 23.45 and 23.58 prohibit lend-
ers from requiring as a condition to granting or amending a loan agree-
ment that the borrower waive its right to open-space or agricultural
valuation.279 But lenders can require the taxes saved by open-space or
agricultural valuation to be placed in escrow.280 Amended sections
23.75(j), 23.84(e), and 23.94(e) provide that an appraisal district has only
five years, rather than ten years under prior law, to discover that property
has been erroneously allowed special appraisal as timber land, recrea-
and use tax adopted by the district, and if so, whether the sales and use tax on added
property would be constitutional given that voters in the added area would not have ap-
proved the tax.
274. Id § 31.115. The voluntary payment rule provided that a person who voluntarily
pays an illegal tax has no claim for repayment. See Hunt County Tax Appraisal. District v.
Rubbermaid Inc., 719 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
275. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.115 (Vernon Supp. 1996). Much of the teeth of the
voluntary payment rule was eliminated in 1989 when section 42.08(b) was amended to
provide that taxpayers could appeal by paying the amount of taxes due on the property
under the order from which the protest is being appealed. 71st Leg., R.S., (796), § 43, 1989
Tex. Gen. Laws 3591, 3604 (Vernon).
276. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.413 and 42.015 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
277. Id. § 41.413(d). The statute does not expressly limit the requirement to furnish
notices of reappraisals to lessees obligated to reimburse the owner for taxes; however, one
presumes such is the intent of the statute.
278. Appraisal review boards and courts can raise as well as lower appraised values.
Therefore, if the owner does not desire to challenge the appraised value of leased property,
the owner may want to consider filing a protective protest to assure control of the adminis-
trative and judicial process.
279. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.45 and 23.58 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
280. Id.
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tional land or public access airport property.281
Several amendments related to tax collections and tax liens. New legis-
lation enables municipalities, through the use of tax warrants, to seize and
sell abandoned real property of less than one acre if property taxes are
delinquent for at least five years or if there has been a lien on the prop-
erty for at least three years. 282 New section 32.065 and amended sections
32.06 and 34.02 address the transfer of tax liens, and clarify that a trans-
feree of a tax lien is subrogated to and is entitled to exercise any right or
remedy possessed by the transferring tax unit.283
In addition the legislature substantially rewrote the appraisal and col-
lection procedures for automobile dealers.284 The special appraisal rules
for automobile dealers have been extended to smaller boat and outboard
motors dealers.285
IV. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, PROCEDURE, LIENS,
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. LEGISLATION
Following R Communications, Inc. v. Sharp,286 which held that a tax-
payer's right to challenge judicially a sales tax deficiency could not be
conditioned on payment of the tax at issue, taxpayers began filing tax
cases without payment of tax. Not surprisingly, the 1995 Legislature at-
tempted to deal with the R Communications holding by providing that, in
certain tax disputes, taxpayers could nonetheless be required to pay the
tax prior to contest, unless they comply with certain statutory require-
ments relating to ability to pay. Specifically, the legislature amended sec-
tion 112.108 to provide that after filing an oath of inability to pay the tax,
penalties and interest due, a party may be excused from the requirement
of prepayment of tax as a prerequisite to appeal if the court, after notice
and hearing, finds that such prepayment would constitute an unreasona-
ble restraint on the party's right of access to the courts.287 In addition,
the amendment provides that a grant of declaratory relief against the
state or state agency shall not entitle the winning party to recover attor-
ney fees. 288
The 1995 Legislature continued the expansion of criminal penalties in
the tax context by amending section 171.363 regarding willful and fraudu-
lent acts. This section now provides that an offense is committed if an
281. Id. §§ 23.750), 23.84(e) and 23.94(e).
282. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 88 33.91-33.95 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
283. Id. §§ 32.065, 32.06 and 34.02.
284. Id. §§ 23.12(f), 23.121, 23.122 and 23,123.
285. Id. §§ 23.12(g), 23.12D. Vessels more than 65 feet in length, and canoes, kayaks
and similar crafts under 14 feet in length do not qualify. Id. § 23.12D(a)(14).
286. 875 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994).
287. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.108 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
288. Id. Though this provision is part of the legislature's response to R Communica-
tions, there is a strong possibility that this amendment does not fully comply with the Texas
Supreme Court's decision and intent.
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accountant or agent or an officer or employee of a corporation knowingly
provides false information on any report, return, or other document filed
by the corporation.289
The 1995 Legislature also amended section 111.016 of the Tax Code to
provide for collection from certain persons who fail to pay taxes of a busi-
ness.290 The amendments to this section specifically extend liability to
"an individual who controls or supervises the collection of tax or money
from another person" or "an individual who controls or supervises the
accounting for and paying over of the tax or money," who willfully fails to
pay or cause to be paid the amount at issue.291 The penalty imposed is
equal to the total amount of tax not paid, in addition to any other penalty
provided by law. 292 A responsible individual's liability is not affected by
dissolution of the entity.293 "Responsible individual" is defined to in-
clude an officer, manager, director, or employee of a corporation, associa-
tion, or limited liability company, or member of a partnership, who in
such capacity, is under a duty to perform an act with respect to the collec-
tion, accounting, or payment of a tax or money subject to the "trust fund"
provisions.294 "Tax" is defined to include tax or money subject to the
"trust fund" provisions, including penalty and interest.295 This provision,
which triggered substantial debate among taxpayers and comptroller
staff, is somewhat more favorable to taxpayers than earlier versions of
proposed legislation which did not include the willful requirement.
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether a refund check
constitutes a final decision for purposes of tolling the statute of limita-
tions in Sharp v. AMSCO Steel Co.296 On January 8, 1990, AMSCO filed
franchise tax refund claims for years 1986 and 1987 on the basis of the
Sage Energy decision 297 and pursuant to the comptroller's abbreviated
refund procedure for such refunds. The comptroller issued AMSCO re-
fund checks on February 2, 1990. On June 4, 1990, AMSCO filed an
amended claim for the refund of additional taxes for 1986 and 1987,
which were denied. The district court granted the later refund claims,
and in February 1995, the court of appeals reversed as to part of the re-
fund. 298 The court noted that the January 8, 1990 claim tolled the four
year refund limitations period until a final decision was issued by the
289. Id. § 171.363 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
290. Id. § 111.016.
291. Id. § 111.016(b).
292. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.106(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
293. Id. § 111.016(b).
294. Id. § 111.016(d)(1).
295. Id. § 111.016(d)(2).
296. 893 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
297. Bullock v. Sage Energy Co., 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
298. AMSCO Steel, 893 S.W.2d 742.
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comptroller.299 The appellate court found, however, that the refund
check constituted an informal final decision by agreed settlement under
the Administrative Procedure Act, which stopped the tolling of the stat-
ute. Thus, the statute of limitations barred the amended claim for 1986,
but the amended claim for 1987 was within the four year limitations pe-
riod, even if the period had not been tolled.300
The court of appeals also examined the statutory language of the re-
fund provisions in Borden, Inc. v. Sharp301 and held that a 1990 claim for
refund of franchise tax for the 1982 tax year was not timely because previ-
ous timely refund claims for the same tax year did not indefinitely open
the statute of limitations for that tax year. The court of appeals upheld
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the comptroller on the
basis that such claim was barred by the statute of limitations.30 2 Based
upon a literal reading of sections 111.205(4) and 111.107 of the Tax
Code.30 3 Borden argued that since it previously made a timely refund
claim for 1982, Borden was subject to assessment by the comptroller "at
any time." Therefore, Borden's time period to file refund claims for 1982
should be indefinite. 3°4 Employing statutory construction guidelines, the
court of appeals looked beyond the plain meaning of the statute to deter-
mine the intent of the legislature. The court stated that Borden's inter-
pretation of the statute would effectively result in a repeal of the statute
of limitations with respect to taxpayers that had once filed a timely re-
fund claim.305 In addition, the court found that the comptroller inter-
preted the refund-assessment exception as granting the comptroller a
limited counterclaim right during the pendency of the refund, but not
granting an unlimited right to assess tax deficiencies; therefore, the limi-
tations provisions did not grant the taxpayer an unlimited right to claim a
refund.3o6
C. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
In Decision 30,262 the taxpayer succeeded in showing the comptroller
that she should not be liable under the successor liability rules, since her
acquisition of the "business" was more in the nature of an acquisition of a
299. Id at 744.
300. Id. at 745.
301. 888 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
302. Id at 620.
303. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.205(4) (as then in effect). The legislature repealed
this subsection in 1993. See infra note 306. Section 111.20 provides an exception to the
four year statute of limitations and generally allows the Comptroller to assess a tax at any
time if a taxpayer has filed a timely claim for refund for such period. Section 111.107
allows a taxpayer to claim a refund during the time in which the comptroller may assess a
tax.
304. Borden, 888 S.W.2d at 617.
305. Id. at 618.
306. Id. at 619. Note that TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.205(4) was repealed effective
September 1, 1993 and replaced by TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.2051 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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tradename than the acquisition of a continuing business. 30 7 In Decision
31,965 on the other hand, the comptroller held that a taxpayer who
purchased a restaurant business was liable for the taxes of the restaurant
seller pursuant to section 111.020.308
In a continuation of cases seeking to impose sanctions when a corpora-
tion has forfeited its charter,30 9 a Houston court of appeals, in El T. Mexi-
can Restaurants, Inc. v. Bacon310 concluded that a sole shareholder of a
corporation that had its charter forfeited for failure to pay franchise
taxes, but that had not been dissolved, was not able to bring suit individu-
ally as a successor in interest to the corporation. The court recognized
that the shareholder was the holder of the beneficial title to the corpora-
tion's assets and was entitled to prosecute actions necessary to protect his
rights. Nonetheless, the court held that the shareholder could not recover
individually on the corporation's claims or, since the corporation had not
dissolved, as a successor in interest.31'
In another court of appeals case, Davis v. State,3 12 the court of appeals
held that even before the 1987 amendment of section 111.016 of the Tax
Code to include "trust fund" language, "the sales taxes collected by
agent/sellers on behalf of the state, while not expressly characterized as
trust funds, were of a trust fund nature and thus were the state's prop-
erty."313 This conclusion enabled the trial court to find that holding Da-
vis responsible for taxes would not constitute a retroactive application to
Davis of the 1987 amendment to section 111.016.3 14
V. CONCLUSION
As the Governor and the legislature continue to assess the various al-
ternatives for tax reform, taxpayers and the comptroller continue con-
testing the limits of the current tax structure. Both the new alternatives
and the current struggles will further develop Texas tax law in the coming
years.
307. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,262 (Feb. 2, 1994), 1994 TEX. TAX LEXIS
83.
308. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,965 (Feb. 7,1995), 1995 TEx. TAX LEXIS
83; see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,202, 1995 TEX. TAX LEXIS 43 (Jan. 10,
1995) for a discussion of several successor liability cases and issues.
309. See, e.g., Serna v. State, 877 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied)
(holding that the "Tax Code no longer requires that debts be knowingly and consensually
created for an officer to be held liable"); Jonnet v. State, 877 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1994, writ denied) (decided the same day as Serna and reached a similar result);
Cain v. State, 882 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ) (holding director and
officer personally liable for corporate debt following forfeiture of charter for failure to pay
franchise tax).
310. No. 01-92-00605-CV, 1995 WL 2622, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Jan. 5,
1995, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication).
311. Id. at *2.
312. 904 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, n.w.h.).
313. Id. at 954.
314. Id.
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